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This dissertation comprises three articles that discuss various concerns 
affecting urban governance and urban habitat in developing countries and regions. The 
articles are organized in chronological order. The first, Uneasy Partnerships between 
City Hall and Citizens, reviews a series of case study reports commissioned by the 
author between 1995 and 2001 during the later part of  his tenure as a research 
coordinator at the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development 
(UNRISD) in Geneva, Switzerland. The case studies characterized the forces 
propelling and constraints against achievements of multiple collaborations between 
Civil Society Organizations CSOs and local authorities in Chicago, East St. Louis, Ho 
Chi Minh City, Jinja, Johannesburg, Lima, Mumbai, and São Paulo. The periods 
covered by the individual studies vary, though several stretch as long as from 1990 to 
2003. The second article in the collection is Self-built Housing in Developing 
Countries: Current Contributions and Challenges to Local Development through 
Volunteerism. The study drew on research stimulated by the UNRISD project and 
subsequent contacts with community organizations and local governments that 
developed and promoted innovative approaches to collective land occupation, housing 
construction, and management as community-building and political-awareness-raising 
exercises. The final essay in this collection, Security of Housing Tenure in the 
People’s Republic of China: Background, Trends, and Issues, is an exploration of  
emerging housing issues in the People’s Republic of China. The main concern of the 
article is to begin to describe how ill-conceived and poorly implemented land and 
housing reforms since the late 1990s have increasingly accelerated the erosion of 
access to secure tenure to housing for low-income groups in both the rural and urban 
sectors. This rapid return of insecure housing tenure has occurred during a period of 
massive expansion of commercial housing and house ownership in urban China. 
Socio-spatial segregation and income inequality are hallmarks of this process. iii 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
UNEASY PARTNERSHIPS BETWEEN CITY HALL AND CITIZENS
1 
Background and Introduction 
When the first United Nations Conference on Human Settlements, Habitat I, 
was held in Vancouver, Canada, in 1976, the design and implementation of programs 
and policies to address the problems of housing and human settlements were seen to 
be the almost exclusive responsibility of governments. At that time, it was still 
generally believed that rapid urbanization could be slowed and its negative effects 
mitigated. Contrary to these optimistic projections, urbanization has continued 
unabated in many parts of the world. By the beginning of the twenty-first century the 
majority of the world’s population was already or would soon be living in cities, and 
by some estimates that proportion will increase to two-thirds by the year 2025. The 
number of megacities (cities with populations over 8 million), which are often 
characterized as “ungovernable” as a result of the seemingly intractable nature and 
concentration of social problems they encompass, grew from 2 in 1950 to 21 in 1990. 
Sixteen of these are in developing countries. By the year 2015, the number of 
megacities is expected to reach 33, 27 of which will be in developing countries. 
Today civil society plays a crucial role in finding and implementing solutions 
to the problems of urbanization, and it appears that this role will only grow in the 
coming decades. People’s organizations, such as community-based organizations 
(CBOs), grassroots movements, and volunteer groups at the very basis of civil society, 
see no future in permanent confrontation or competition with the state. Rather, they 
want a responsible and competent state at all levels—one that is responsive and 
                                                 
1 This article draws largely on published and unpublished research and progress reports from the 
UNRISD-UNV project Volunteer Action and Local Democracy: A Partnership for a Better Urban 
Future. 2 
accountable to the needs of all people. In many countries, achieving this will require 
reforms that strengthen local governments in ways that enable them to become better 
partners with local communities in implementing bottom-up development strategies. 
And, for such reforms to achieve optimal results, civil society organizations at the 
local level will have to be strengthened as well. 
To address these needs a joint project was developed by the United Nations 
Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) and the United Nations 
Volunteers Programme (UNV): Volunteer Action and Local Democracy: A 
Partnership for a Better Urban Future. The goal was to identify the successes of, and 
constraints on, collaborations between CBOs and volunteer organizations, on one side, 
and local governments, on the other, in designing, implementing, and evaluating social 
and economic policy at the local level, and to use this information to initiate and 
inform a dialogue among local actors about concrete ways of enhancing future 
collaborations of this kind. 
This second UNRISD-UNV multicity action research project was undertaken 
as both a follow-up to the World Summit for Social Development and as a 
contribution to the Habitat II conference held in Istanbul in June 1996. Provisional 
findings of some 20 case studies conducted in Chicago, Johannesburg-Soweto, Lima, 
Mumbai, and São Paulo, along with related research in East St. Louis (USA), Ho Chi 
Minh City (Viet Nam), and Jinja (Uganda), were first discussed at an international 
workshop in Kumburgaz, Turkey, during the last week in May 1996. These 
preliminary findings were then synthesized and presented at Habitat II. Since then, a 
process of dialogue and action research has continued in most of the cities, and this is 
reflected in a number of the studies that were finalized in 2001. Additional work was 
also conducted in six Chinese cities in 1997, drawing on earlier VALD studies and 3 
collaborators in addition to those from the Chinese government and academic 
institutions. 
This report is divided into five sections following this introduction. In order, 
they review the focus and methodology of the VALD project, its preliminary findings 
dating from Habitat II, the issue areas addressed in the case studies of partnership 
between community and volunteer organizations and local authorities, a synthesis of 
the overall findings of the project concerning factors tending to hinder effective 
collaborations between local authorities and community and volunteer organizations, 
and, finally, some recommendations for local authorities interested in enhancing the 
quality of their collaborations with community and volunteer organizations. 
Project Focus and Methodology 
The collaborations that the project sought to document were those 
demonstrating an active, nonexploitative partnership between agencies of the 
government operating at the local level and community organizations. In such 
relationships the community, through its volunteer and civic organizations, exercises 
its right to participate in decisions concerning the allocation of resources at the local 
level. Community members are not merely purveyors of free or below-market-price 
labor or materials in return for services or complementary resources from the state. 
The relationships they seek, rather than creating political or economic dependencies 
(as often happens in participation-as-subcontractor schemes), are partnerships that 
create skills, knowledge, and the capacity to organize effectively among community 
members, and open channels for democratizing information and decision-making 
processes at the local level. Such relationships are termed “non-co-optive” or 
“enabling.” 4 
The project made an effort to engage key actors at the local level, and 
especially government authorities and community organizations (together with their 
supporters elsewhere in the local civil society) in a dialogue on how to improve the 
possibilities for such “enabling relationships.” The project used the Habitat II 
conference as a pretext for initiating these dialogues in a set of large cities on four 
continents. 
In each of the core cities, several detailed case studies on specific 
collaborations between community organizations and local government were carried 
out. In addition, two thematic papers were prepared:
2 one reviewing the legal and 
regulatory framework that determines in a formal sense the possibility for 
collaboration, and one addressing the larger political economy of development and 
urbanization that influences the possibilities for collaborations between community 
groups and local authorities. Collectively, the case studies and thematic papers served 
as the basis for a dialogue among diverse local actors on how to improve the 
possibilities for future collaborations. 
Preliminary Findings and Recommendations Presented at Habitat II 
The findings and recommendations from the draft “City Case Studies” 
discussed in Kumburgaz, Turkey (27–30 May 1996) were further synthesized for 
presentation at Habitat II. These were as follows: 
♦  Community-local authority collaborations exist in all the core cities surveyed.
3 
However, the picture of collaborations with local authorities painted by 
community organizations and their interlocutors is a sobering one. 
                                                 
2 Authors and titles will be given at the point where the studies are mentioned. 
3 The distinction between “core” and “noncore” cities was not made explicitly in the report at Habitat II. 
The projects in the noncore cities—East St. Louis, Jinja, and Ho Chi Minh City—were at that time 
laying the groundwork for future collaborations. These efforts are described briefly after the 
experiences in the core cities in the next section.  5 
♦  The genuineness—or degree of partnership—that characterizes these 
collaborations varies greatly from city to city and between collaborations 
within cities. CBOs and local associations remain too weak and disconnected 
to propel change; instead, they are “takers” or “implementers” of policy 
change initiated from above. 
♦  True power-sharing relationships between community organizations of 
marginal or vulnerable groups and local authorities are, in fact, rare. And those 
partnerships that appear to be genuine may turn out to be less than that on 
closer examination. The direct impact on policy formulation by community 
and volunteer organizations is extremely limited. Governments still appear to 
play the dominant role in promoting change. They are followed in importance 
by NGOs, which have the capacity to lobby upward and organize downward 
while accessing external resources that allow them some independence from 
domestic power brokers. 
♦  Many of the most positive collaborations appear to depend on the support of 
sympathetic officials, often in high places. Others often mask clientelistic 
relationships and practices. Even democratically elected urban administrations 
supported by progressive political parties are not immune to such practices. In 
either case, the lack of institutional supports that buttress democratic state–civil 
society relationships—such as legal structures, administrative regulations, and 
norms protecting and promoting the rights of communities to organize 
themselves and to participate in decision making; the existence of strong 
community organizations; broad access by community organizations to 
information influencing decisions affecting life and livelihood, and the like—
hampers the development of genuine partnerships between local authorities 
and vulnerable or marginalized groups. 6 
♦  Even where strong community organizations do exist, collaborations with local 
authorities often begin a process of co-optation or demobilization from within 
the organization. Efforts at advocacy, community organizing, and 
consciousness-raising formerly undertaken by the community group may 
deteriorate once the organization becomes saddled with responsibilities for 
delivering and managing “public services.” New and very different 
responsibilities often reorient the priorities of small organizations away from 
their original constituency. 
♦  External forces also erode the basis for community action and genuine 
partnerships with local authorities. Economic restructuring has impoverished 
many communities, lessening the health, leisure time, and confidence that 
individuals and families need to organize themselves. At the same time, the 
prevailing ideological climate reinforces sentiments against demands made by 
the poor on the state. In many cities, the poor have been characterized as part 
of the problem—a burden on the city and the rest of its residents, rather than a 
symptom of inegalitarian social and economic systems. In this scenario, it is 
becoming easier to manipulate and divide disadvantaged groups with identity 
politics. Failing to establish and maintain internal cohesiveness, communities 
are less capable of negotiating with local authorities from a position of strength. 
The less-than-positive assessment of the impact of community organizations 
on policy and on resource distribution does not deny that the experiences covered in 
these studies had many positive side effects. The collaborations clearly benefited 
participating individuals and organizations and, as pilot projects, they provided some 
useful lessons. 7 
Recommendations for enhancing the environment in which genuine 
collaborations can grow were outlined in three broad areas: institutionalization, 
capacity-building, and resources. Among the points highlighted were the need for 
constitutional and legal structures to protect and promote partnerships between local 
authorities and community organizations; capacity-building for CBOs, NGOs, and 
local authorities, including training and regulatory structures to help them develop and 
maintain internally democratic practices; reorienting the education of planners, 
architects, and urban management specialists so that participatory action research 
(PAR) with community organizations becomes a standard operating procedure; and 
locating and allocating resources at the local level to make it possible for community 
organizations to assume responsibilities in decision making with local authorities. (In 
the final point, the emphasis is on making it possible for local groups, which are 
already hard-pressed with the simultaneous tasks of community organizing, 
neighborhood planning, and local development activities, to make time to garner the 
necessary skills for becoming equal partners in planning with local authorities.) 
The following section takes a brief tour through the neighborhoods where the 
project was implemented and highlights the issue areas/sectors that each of the case 
studies addressed. These summaries also suggest the diversity of existing 
preconditions that shape and constrain collaborations between local authorities and 
community and volunteer organizations. These need to be taken into account 
whenever intervention in urban communities by outside agencies or actors is being 
designed and/or contemplated. 8 
Results in the Cities 
Chicago 
In Chicago, three neighborhood organizations located on the near south side of 
the city’s traditional central business district joined forces with a city-wide and state-
wide coalition of housing advocates in an effort to protect their homes and 
neighborhoods from incipient processes of gentrification. Despite being well 
organized and assisted by technically and politically adept advocates, these black and 
ethnically Chinese communities appear to be losing ground in their fight to keep their 
neighborhoods intact. The crux of the problem is twofold: the complexity of the urban 
development process makes it class-biased; and the city has abdicated responsibility 
for mediating the competition for urban land between groups with highly disparate 
levels of power and resources. 
Today the city of Chicago relies primarily on market forces to determine where 
different income groups live. Community groups wishing to maintain themselves in a 
specific area are told to come up with a project and submit it to the government. If it is 
economically viable it gets approval. This form of partnership with the local 
government, which often can be achieved only after lengthy pressure and 
confrontation from community organizations, encourages the community organization 
to become a developer.
4 And by doing so, it agrees to play by the principles of market 
sustainability. The Chicago cases
5 show that new developments may be sustainable, 
but not with low-income tenants. Sooner or later, low-income housing, whose 
construction and maintenance are often subsidized from public sources, graduates to 
                                                 
4 In the United States, the often informally constituted neighborhood organization must transform itself 
into a “community development corporation.” This permits the organization to take legal responsibility 
for loans, grants, and other forms of contractual agreements that allow them not only to organize 
“bricks and mortar” projects but also to accept payment from government for services they offer. 
5 David C. Ranney, Patricia A. Wright and Tingwei Zhang, Citizens, Local Government and the 
Development of Chicago’s Near South Side, UNRISD Discussion Paper No. 90. 9 
middle-income housing once the initial loans are repaid. The taxes, rents, and other 
costs soon increase, forcing those who cannot pay to move out. Evidence also suggests 
that once community organizations take on the mantle of developer, the linkage of 
interests between neighborhood residents and their organization becomes more 
tenuous, and so, too, the prospect of the organization pursuing the broadest community 
needs. 
Johannesburg-Soweto 
In Johannesburg-Soweto, researchers felt there had been so many “structural 
breaks” in South Africa’s recent history—the un-banning of the ANC, the first 
democratic elections and government, the collapse of many anti-apartheid civil society 
organizations whose funding and best personnel shifted to the newly legitimate 
government, and so on—that conditions in the late 1980s and early 1990s were not a 
helpful reference point for community-government interaction in the mid-1990s. 
Therefore, researchers decided to survey residents in three different kinds of 
low-income neighborhoods to understand their perception of local authorities and 
community organizations, as well as their own role within the community and to 
attempt to draw some conclusions about strategies for making genuine collaborations 
feasible in the future. 
The community-level research took place in the months following the first 
local government elections in November 1995, thus reflecting expectations that 
existed before any significant experience of cooperation between the new local 
authorities (councilors) and community organizations. Some of the findings included 
that
6 
                                                 
6 David Everatt, Grace Rapholo and Sarah Davies, The South African Experience: Analyzing Local-
Level Governance in Tladi-Moletsane, Ivory Park and the Johannesburg Inner City, mimeo, 
1996. David Everatt, Grace Rapholo and Sarah Davies, The Southern African Experience: 
Background Document, mimeo, 1999. 10 
♦  minimal collaboration exists among residents, their organizations and local 
government 
♦  residents remain largely unaware of their rights and obligations vis-à-vis local 
government 
♦  councilors often have no staff, no budget, and no experience in public 
administration, nor do they have detailed descriptions of the roles they are 
expected to fill or how to accomplish what is expected of them 
♦  newly elected councilors’ contacts with the state bureaucracy are often 
frustrated by obstructionist officials still holding power 
♦  extremely low levels of technical, financial and human resources are available 
to both community organizations and newly elected councilors 
♦  attendance by residents at civic
7 meetings has fallen off (reasons cited include 
the attitude that there was no need to attend because “our people” were now 
running the government; weakening of the civics because the previous 
leadership had been absorbed into government; and emerging political 
conflicts within and among the civics). 
Lima 
As Peru’s capital and largest metropolitan area, Lima is home to three levels of 
government: the national, the city (Province of Lima), and 40 district-level 
governments (municipios) making up the Province of Lima. It was at the district level 
that researchers felt the most innovative collaborations in Lima were occurring. Case 
studies were selected from each of the four major geographic zones comprising the 
Province of Lima: the Northern, Southern and Eastern Cones, and the historic city 
center (El Cercado). 
                                                 
7 “Civic” is the term commonly used in South Africa to denote neighborhood or residents’ associations. 11 
In the Northern Cone, three case studies
8 describe the efforts of women’s 
CBOs and local NGOs to work with district governments to ensure improved nutrition, 
sanitation, and public health in their districts. The Eastern Cone case study
9 compares 
two separate experiences in which neighborhood associations, community kitchens, 
mother’s clubs, and other organizations from a set of contiguous neighborhoods 
formed a committee to engage in social and economic planning at the subdistrict level. 
In one case the municipio joined the effort; in the other it did not. The Southern Cone 
case study
10 examines the efforts of a retail merchant’s association, community 
organizations, NGOs, and the municipio of Villa El Salvador to develop the 
infrastructure and supply links necessary to prevent hoarding, price gouging, and other 
forms of corruption in the marketing of food in the municipio. In the Cercado
11 
government collaboration with community organizations barely exists because the 
level of community organization is so limited. 
In all but the Cercado case, interaction between local authorities and 
community organizations resulted in positive impacts on the individuals involved in 
the community organizations, on the organizations themselves and on the development 
of innovative and appropriate approaches to social problems at the local level. But 
their immediate influence on policy—in other words, on resource distribution and 
decision-making structures—was minimal. This typically stems from the 
                                                 
8 María Josefina Huamán, Gloria Cubas Rivera and Juan Pedro Mora Sono, Los nuevos desafios de la 
ciudad para las mujeres y la visibilizacion de su participacion en la construccion del habitat: el 
caso del cono norte, mimeo, 1997 (a compilation of three case studies). Jaime Joseph, Organizaciones 
comunitarias de base y gobiernos locales, mimeo, 1997. These and the other Lima studies have been 
revised and updated and were published in Lima in monograph form in early 2000. 
9 Julio A. Calderón Cockburn, La organizacion zonal de las comunidades de base y su articulacion 
con los gobiernos locales en el cono este, mimeo, 1997. 
10 Eduardo Ballón, La experiencia de comercializacion del frente unico de comerciantes minoristas 
de villa el Salvador, Lima, Peru, mimeo, 1997. 
11 Federico Arnillas L. and Arq. Silvia de los Rios, Organizaciones comunitarias de base el cercado 
de Lima y formas de coordinación y participación en la gestión municipal, mimeo, 1997. 12 
unwillingness or inability of the mayor to transfer adequate resources to the 
collaborating organizations or to extend to them control over the resources needed to 
make the collaboration function as intended by the community participants. Excessive 
dependence of these collaborations on the goodwill of the mayor proves to be another 
important impediment to their sustainability. 
Mumbai 
In Mumbai, two of the three main collaborations studied reflect a similar 
phenomenon, albeit substituting dependence on a senior civil servant for dependence 
on the district mayor. In the case of the Rationing Kruti Samiti, the successes of a 
coalition of NGOs, CBOs, and government agencies in halting corruption and abuse in 
the public distribution system of subsidized grains, oils, and cooking fuels began to 
rapidly erode when the officer who catalyzed the effort was transferred to another post 
outside the rationing system.
12 In the second case, the Deputy Municipal 
Commissioner (DMC) with jurisdiction over Jogeshwari, one of Mumbai’s largest 
slums, brought city agencies, NGOs, and CBOs together in a two-year-long fact-
finding collaboration in order to unravel a series of conflicts over the legal rights and 
responsibilities of tenants, chawl (tenement) owners, and various municipal authorities 
vis-à-vis one another. Using the information collected, the DMC ruled in favor of the 
tenants, strengthening their rights to tenure and security against harassment by the 
chawl owners. However, the DMC was transferred not long after making his ruling, 
which eight years later has yet to be implemented. While this suggests that 
implementation may have been too dependent on the DMC, it also highlights a more 
serious problem: the absence of accountability for the civil service to follow through 
on its own decisions or rulings. 
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in the City of Mumbai, mimeo, 1998. 13 
The Mohalla Committee case study
13 describes incipient efforts of the Mumbai 
Police Force to open effective channels of communication and cooperation between 
itself, community organizations and ordinary citizens. The police have been accused in 
some quarters of having taken sides in the communal strife experienced in Mumbai in 
late 1992 and early 1993, and the proposed action was intended to show the police 
force’s commitment to promoting harmony among Muslim and Hindu residents living 
in close proximity in Mumbai’s slums. To date, however, doubts remain about the 
nature of the collaboration established. Two main reasons for this are that 1) the 
selection of Mohalla Committee members remains under the direct control of local 
police offices, and 2) the police force strongly resists any suggestion that the Mohalla 
Committees should directly monitor police work in the community. 
The studies in Mumbai also highlight other constraints that must be overcome 
before there can be more genuine partnerships between community organizations and 
local authorities. These include internal weaknesses of CBOs, their over reliance on 
NGOs (whose number and resources are extremely limited), and the general resistance 
or inability of the lower-level bureaucracy to work with CBOs and NGOs. 
São Paulo 
The São Paulo case studies reflect the willingness of the first Worker’s Party 
(WP) administration (1989-1992) to democratize the traditionally closed and 
clientelistic machinery of urban government in one of the world’s largest cities. Of the 
four São Paulo cases, two describe initiatives of the WP administration
14 and two 
examine ongoing initiatives of community organizations and NGOs that the new 
                                                 
13 Sushoba Bharve, Mumbai Mohalla Committees: A Case Study, mimeo, 1996. 
14 Valmir de Souza, Acao cultural regionalizada area central da cidade de São Paulo, mimeo, 1996. 
Pedro Jacobi, Orcamento participativo: o caso de São Paulo (1989–1992), à luz das experiencias de 
Porto Alegre e Belo Horizonte, mimeo, 1997. Additional information on the Erundina Administration 
is contained in Pedro Jacobi, Overview Paper: São Paulo, mimeo, 1998. 14 
mayor, Luisa Erundina, decided to promote for “demonstration” purposes.
15 The most 
public and extensive experiment of the WP administration was the Participatory 
Budget (PB), which for the first time formalized channels for public review and 
comment on the city’s spending priorities. Its most revolutionary feature was to offer 
community organizations throughout the city the opportunity to comment on and offer 
their own spending proposals. The process for mobilizing such large-scale 
participation was cumbersome and, despite efforts to improve and streamline it in 
subsequent years, the PB never caught the imagination of the public or had a large 
impact on the decision-making process. The greatest impediment to the successful 
implementation of the PB was, however, that the final spending decisions were made 
by the city council, on which the WP held a minority position. Thus, the WP was able 
neither to change the legislative basis of the budget-making process nor to force the 
city councilors to accept the recommendations of the PB. And without an effective 
campaign to convince the public of the validity of the PB, it will be hard to overcome 
these weaknesses.
16 
The two cases promoted by civil society organizations, and supported by the 
WP administration for their demonstration value, pioneered lessons in employment 
creation for the homeless through solid waste recycling cooperatives, and self-
managed construction of high-density, multistory, low-income housing. Both of these 
initiatives represented innovative solutions to pressing problems of low-income and 
marginalized groups, but neither could muster adequate popular recognition during the 
WP’s administration. In the case of the recycling cooperative, economic sustainability 
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16 Relatively successful instances of Participatory Budgeting (PB) have proceeded in recent years in 
Porto Alegre and Belo Horizonte, and may eventually catalyze a change in public opinion about the PB 
in São Paulo. 15 
has been elusive because of the absence of laws and administrative practices necessary 
to make consumers bear the real cost of nonrecyclable solid waste. Thus there is little 
incentive to recycle anything, and the cooperative designed to reintegrate homeless 
people into the labor market as collectors of recyclable materials languishes. The case 
of self-managed construction of low-income housing has evolved more positively, 
albeit long after the WP was voted out of office. In part this is due to the visible
17 
success of the model:
 the Apuaña apartments have turned out to be an attractive, land-
saving, low-cost alternative to other social housing schemes in São Paulo, a fact 
acknowledged both in Brazil by conservative and progressive politicians alike, and by 
the Habitat II meeting in Istanbul in 1996. 
The “Noncore” Cities: East St. Louis, Ho Chi Minh City and Jinja 
The three noncore cities differed from the five core cities in the initial 
conditions of the collaborations reported on. Most importantly, from the perspective of 
the project, the principal characteristic of the noncore cities was that the collaboration 
with governments and civil society was indirect, in each case mediated if not largely 
promoted by university-based researchers and technicians. Second, in each of the three 
cities no strong evidence of community–local authority collaboration presented itself 
to the researchers. Indeed, none of the researchers involved in the project had reported 
collaborations on the order of those defined in the initial section of this paper. Rather, 
this being the case, the researchers hoped that through long-term, broad-based 
interaction with both community organizations and local authorities, they would help 
promote both the will to and the capacity for partnership/collaboration between two 
crucial protagonists in local-level development. Third, in these cities, the research 
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teams prepared a single report. This profiled the socioeconomic conditions in each city, 
the principles and methods underlying their interventions, and the progress made as of 
1996. 
The largest and longest of these interventions took place in East St. Louis 
(ESL). Beginning in 1990, a multidisciplinary team of researchers and graduate 
students from a public university located some 300 km from ESL began making 
contacts within the city and community organizations. Their aim was to understand 
how the university might assist a turnaround in the social and economic conditions of 
the city, the poorest in the USA at that time. The university put most of its efforts into 
strengthening the capacity of existing community organizations (and helping set up 
new ones) to (a) identify neighborhood concerns, (b) build a consensus about the kinds 
of actions that could be undertaken by citizens (either independently or with the 
assistance of the project), and (c) organize such actions. 
The ESL Action Research Project (ESLARP) then helped identify possible 
allies within agencies and government bodies operating within the boundaries of ESL 
that could be accessed by community organizations to accomplish discrete 
community-driven projects. The next major effort was to lobby local agencies and 
political officials to do their jobs better, and to create conditions for more 
thoroughgoing reform of local government. More recently, housing and economic 
development activities of ESLARP have begun to involve local authorities, in part as a 
result of the high level of organization among local residents. 
In 1996 in both Ho Chi Minh City and Jinja, the government–university–
community collaborations were in the early stage of implementation, with all 
participants in a fact-finding and mutual familiarization process. In both cases, 
pressing environmental problems affecting the physical health and income-generating 
prospects of large numbers of urban poor were the focus of the planned collaborations. 17 
In Jinja, the agreement of the municipal government to implement Local Agenda 21 
recognized officially the importance of bringing civil society organizations, local 
authorities, and business together to solve the problems at hand. In Ho Chi Minh City, 
water and sanitation issues in densely inhabited informal settlements were the foci of 
scientific, sociological, and economic analysis that was to eventually lay the 
groundwork for a series of interventions. Among these were to be actions undertaken 
by and for the residents themselves, others in cooperation with municipal agencies, 
and yet others at the policy level reflecting the analysis of the partners in the action-
research component. A major difference between the ESLARP and the Jinja and Ho 
Chi Minh projects lay in the fact that foreign aid was the source of many of the 
resources available to the latter two projects. On the other hand, an important 
similarity among the three cities existed: the commitment of the external promoters to 
use PAR methods as a tool for planning, implementing, and evaluating their 
interventions. 
Despite the incipient nature of the collaborations in the non-core cities in 1996, 
the researchers established important baselines of socioeconomic conditions against 
which the impact of developing collaborations can be measured. 
Shanghai 
In the year following Habitat II, new research took place in China, culminating 
in a meeting in Shanghai, October 1997, “Comparative Perspectives on Decentralized 
Governance in a Globalizing World.” 
The purpose of the Shanghai meeting was twofold: to disseminate the results 
of the studies completed earlier in the project, and to better understand how Chinese 
cities are attempting to come to grips with the stresses and strains caused by rapid 
rural–urban migration and other compound effects of deepening economic and 18 
administrative reforms. The meeting brought together urban planners, officials, and 
scholars from six large and medium-sized Chinese cities, researchers involved in the 
VALD project, and observers from foundations, international NGOs, and multilateral 
development agencies for three days of discussion and site visits. Participants sought 
to identify the extent to which Chinese cities had begun responding to pressures on 
physical and social infrastructure by opening up new channels of participation in 
decision-making processes, and to gauge whether such changes had begun to affect the 
living and working conditions of residents. 
From the preliminary discussion of the case studies written by Chinese 
planners
18 and a study commissioned by UNRISD,
19 it became evident that 
community participation in planning and decision making remains extremely limited. 
In contrast to many rural Chinese communities where residents select their leaders by 
plebiscite, mayors and other high city officials are still appointed by provincial and, 
sometimes, central government administrators. 
Planners and city officials in six cities prepared case studies exploring their 
understanding of “public participation.” The case studies also relate actual experiences 
with public participation in Chinese cities to efforts at designing more effective 
responses to social problems accompanying the rapid urbanization and economic and 
social policy reforms in the People’s Republic of China. Chinese participants 
compared and contrasted their studies with a selected group of cases presented by 
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members of the project’s research team from other cities, and from a sampling of other 
international research projects with similar concerns. International cases were selected 
to highlight alternative strategies for participation in decision making. 
Case studies suggest that the urban planning apparatus of Chinese cities 
remains strongly top-down and closed, as it was during the pre-reform era, despite 
wide-ranging deregulation in social and economic spheres. These case studies reflect, 
nonetheless, openness to new planning techniques and some small efforts at 
experimentation in public participation. 
Participation in urban governance in Chinese cities has been largely passive: 
planners may undertake opinion surveys, hold exhibitions where plans are unveiled 
and citizens invited to comment and, in some cases, solicit the input of groups of 
experts from different fields when plans are on the verge of completion. Municipal 
legislatures (People’s Consultative Congresses) are empowered to recommend 
legislation to the local government. However, the high proportion of Communist Party 
members in the congress ensures that it will not veer from decisions established by the 
municipal government, whose leading members are also the leading members of the 
Communist Party in the municipality. With power concentrated in a small group of 
high party officials at each level of government, decisions in cities still tend to flow 
from top to bottom, with very little accountability to lower levels of government or 
communities. 
On the third day of the meeting, participants reflected on the state of and 
prospects for participation in planning and decision making in Chinese cities. Almost 
all agreed that simply informing residents of plans or taking opinion surveys did not 
constitute participation. Residents should have an active role in decision making and 
implementation of policies, through either their neighborhood or street committees or 
other organized bodies. Participants felt that it would be useful to experiment with 20 
some of the participatory techniques that cities in other countries are using and 
especially to understand the roles and potential of true
20 NGOs in building the 
capacity of community groups and local authorities to undertake bottom-up 
community development initiatives. 
But building political and practical support for such experimentation and 
research would first require awareness-raising and training at different levels of urban 
government. Mayors and high-level officials will need to understand the value and 
methods of participatory decision making; officials in the basic-level (sub 
municipal/district) governments, who number some 480,000, must be encouraged to 
function more effectively with market rather than administrative mechanisms in 
providing services; and residents’ committees, which suffer from low levels of 
legitimacy because of past involvement in repressive functions and/or because of the 
limited abilities of their cadres, must invigorate themselves by attracting younger and 
more capable people. Finally, participants recognized the importance of 
institutionalizing participation in planning by incorporating appropriate legal 
mechanisms in planning statutes. Additional details of the discussions are found in the 
workshop report.
21 
The following section elaborates a typology of factors that tend to hinder the 
growth of effective collaborations between local authorities and community 
organizations. These include the following: 
1.  External Social/Political/Cultural Environment 
2.  Conditions and Attitudes of Local Authorities 
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3.  Structure of Collaborations 
4.  Roles, Functions, and Attitudes of Intermediary Organizations 
5.  Capacity of Volunteer Organizations 
6.  Capacity of Individuals (Volunteers) 
Factors Hindering Effective Volunteer Efforts in Collaborations with Local 
Authorities 
None of the individual collaborations studied were affected by all of these 
factors, nor were all characteristic of the project cities. But multiple constraints were 
the rule for all collaborations and cities. This should not be surprising. If it were 
otherwise, there would be few challenges to improving governance at the local level. 
The project suggests, however, that the challenges are many and that they occur at a 
variety of levels, from the individual to the macro society. 
The factors “hindering” collaborations are not matched by a list of those 
“enhancing.” The positive scenario is easy to imagine, and is also readily available in 
many forms, including the action agendas of the major UN Summits, international 
covenants, and the charters of numerous international bodies promoting good 
governance, the numerous guides to partnership and participation in development 
projects and programs produced by international agencies, and so forth. 
This list is provided to help organizations engaged in grassroots interventions 
in low-income urban settings. Its chief use is as a checklist when considering the 
feasibility of intervention, and at what level. The list should also encourage the 
development of indicators of progress for intervention in urban areas. Over time, has 
the environment changed to be more or less hospitable to collaborations between local 
authorities and community organizations? In what way? What do the key actors need 
to do to promote such change? 22 
External Social/Political/Cultural Environment 
A fractious party-political environment, resulting in frequent changes of 
leadership in municipalities, can retard the evolution of positive interaction between 
community groups and local authorities. On the one hand, policies encouraging 
genuine participation in grassroots-level decision making can be easily undone, or on 
the other, civic (volunteer) impulses can be diverted to serving clients (particularistic 
interests) rather than those of the larger vulnerable community (Chicago, SP). 
Traditions of clientelism die hard, even in formally democratic states and cities. 
Political leaders and nonelected members of urban authorities still derive popular 
support from such practices. These, of course, work against truly civic volunteer 
contributions because their chief aim is to maintain the power of an individual and 
system that supports her/him rather than to promote the well-being of the larger group 
(SP, Mumbai, and Johannesburg). 
Macroeconomic policies and/or administrative reforms that radically increase 
the role of market forces in daily life can expand or contract opportunities for 
volunteer action in urban communities. The imposition of structural adjustment 
policies were seen to stimulate some forms of organizing for survival that in the short 
run accomplished the purpose. But there is also evidence that too much competition 
between individuals and groups can have negative impacts in the long run. 
Organizations of survival have neither the resources nor the outlook to create, plan, 
and organize activities that change inequitable social structures (Lima). 
The lack of administrative rules and legislation protecting and promoting 
collaborations with volunteer groups and other civil-society organizations are a major 
hindrance to effective participation of grassroots actors in urban decision making. In 
only one of the cities studied was such legislation on the books. However, the 
implementation of the legislation remains stalled 5 years after promulgation. 23 
Authorities are therefore able to treat civic participation as a discretionary, rather than 
mandatory, area of governance (Chicago, Lima, Johannesburg, Mumbai, and SP). 
Decentralization is expanding the latitude of cities to adopt policies to enhance 
social integration in the local space. This occurs primarily by leaving to the local 
authorities the setting of social policy and, to an even larger extent, its implementation. 
While the capacity to implement such policy is in question because the resources 
needed to implement it may not accompany decision-making autonomy, the city 
allocates certain economic activities to enhance the status of poor and/or marginal 
groups. Opportunities for this were found in solid waste collection, environmental 
protection, and housing provision. Unfortunately, the authorities were unwilling to 
explore these possibilities to their logical extension, and important advantages to the 
poor were lost (Chicago, Lima, and SP). 
In all the cities of the study, there appears to be a willingness (at the level of 
action, if not rhetoric) to back away from the role of mediator of the public good. 
Market mechanisms are given much greater sway than would be expected from the 
recent history and politics of the city. 
The rapid expansion and differentiation within the NGO sector, coupled with 
the increasing “marketization” of their roles, especially as service contractors, has 
created among local authorities great confusion about and solid resistance to working 
with NGOs. Local authorities have expressed legitimate concerns about the 
representativeness, accountability, governance structures, and ambitions of many 
NGOs, CBOs, and other CSOs (Chicago, Mumbai). 
Communities with a strong tradition of mutual assistance have a better chance 
of developing the local organizations that can effectively interact with local authorities 
in efforts to improve urban living conditions. Conversely, urban communities 
comprising large numbers of migrants of diverse origins have more difficulties 24 
organizing themselves, or being organized with the help of external agents (e.g., 
NGOs, religious groups, municipal agencies, etc.) (Lima, São Paulo [SP]). 
Violence and insecurity stemming from the increasing prevalence of extralegal 
force and intimidation tactics diminish the capacity of communities to organize and 
pursue collective social goals. Public institutions, churches, and all manner of 
volunteer organizations suffer the threat of arms. Individuals who would otherwise 
participate in public-spirited activities resist the impulse in order to avoid 
unnecessarily sacrificing their lives and their families’ well-being (Lima, 
Johannesburg, and Mumbai). 
Conditions and Attitudes of Local Authorities 
In none of the cities studied did there exist a strong tradition of incorporating 
community and volunteer groups in significant decision-making processes. In practice, 
ignoring grassroots actors was closer to the rule. 
The relative impoverishment of local authorities (as compared with central and 
intermediate governing bodies) appears to exacerbate sentiments of envy and distrust 
toward civil-society groups, who are often seen as competing for resources that would 
otherwise go to the local authority. 
Nontransparent behavior and restricted information flows characterize most of 
the local authorities—even those considered to be open to community participation—
in the study. This continues to disempower volunteer action across the spectrum of 
urban governance. 
Corruption and/or lack of internal accountability within local authorities (Lima, 
SP, Mumbai) permits positive action taken by one branch of local authorities to stymie 
or block positive change brought about by other branches in collaboration with 
community groups. 25 
Local authorities are inclined to take an instrumental view of participation, that 
is,  to welcome it when the community and volunteer groups provide labor, material 
inputs or, simply, the façade of democratic decision making that allows an otherwise 
top-down project to go forward. Even the most “participatory” local authorities fear 
too much genuine participation. 
The exceedingly low level of fiscal and administrative capacity of local 
authorities often prevents them from being able to join as effective partners with 
community and volunteer groups. They may neither know how to interact or work 
with community groups nor have any significant material resources they can bring to 
the collaboration (Johannesburg, Mumbai). 
Decentralization in new democracies or newly democratized municipal entities, 
when combined with weak local government capacity and a willingness by the local 
authority to back away from its role as mediator of the public good, can result in 
highly undemocratic governance (Lima, Johannesburg). 
Despite the high level of women’s contribution to the collaborations studied 
and women’s dominant role in the management of low-income communities, 
traditional forms of sexism and class bias were evident in the local authorities and 
were likely to have reduced the positive impact that women could have been having in 
their communities. 
Structure of Collaborations 
Partnerships—relationships in which the partners take genuine responsibility 
for achieving one another’s objectives—were absent in the study. All cases selected 
for analysis were chosen because they were perceived to represent partnerships. None, 
however, came close to this ideal. 26 
Related to the previous point, power imbalances usually favor local authorities 
and/or, secondarily, intermediaries such as NGOs. In no cases have the community 
organizations been able to “drive” the agenda. Some instances did exist in which 
community and volunteer groups were able to block a proposed action for some time, 
but none could do so permanently (Chicago, Mumbai). 
Local authorities are often less stable “players” than community participants. 
This results from changes of political leadership, administrative transfers of important 
decision makers, internal reorganizations, or major shifts in policy. Mutual trust and 
established collaborations are often sacrificed when key contacts in local government 
are lost. This results in a high cost to volunteer organizations because they must 
continually persuade new functionaries of the value of collaboration and joint decision 
making. 
Collaborations are too often based on relations with a sympathetic politician or 
bureaucrat. Such personalized interaction/collaborations are fragile, at best, and 
clientilistic, at worst (Lima, Mumbai, and SP). 
None of the collaborations studied contained formal procedures for record 
keeping, monitoring, or evaluation. As a result, data on the conduct of the 
collaborations had to be acquired from a variety of nonsystematic sources. This lack of 
formal institutional memory not only makes the analysis of the collaborations more 
difficult and tenuous but also results in lost opportunities for building on past 
experience. 27 
Roles, Functions, and Attitudes of Intermediary Organizations
22 
Intermediary organizations such as Nongovernmental Development 
Organizations, grassroots support organizations, voluntary agencies associated with 
church groups or international NGOs, and certain collectives of academic and 
professionals are crucial actors in all of the cities in this study. They often serve as 
conduits of information and/or mediators between local authorities and grassroots 
urban organizations. These institutions also provide training, contacts, and, sometimes, 
direct financial support to the community-level organizations. At present, it appears 
difficult to conceive of CBOs and other grassroots volunteer organizations of 
vulnerable groups carrying out effective collaborations without the support of such 
intermediaries. At the same time, the following observations can be offered about the 
roles of such organizations: 
As mentioned above in the section on the general environment for CSO–local 
authority collaborations, the rapid expansion of NGOs in development work has also 
given rise to some doubt about their motivations, competence, and commitment to 
civic action. Many NGOs have become service providers or social-sector consultants, 
leaving behind—if they ever had them—orientations toward empowerment or 
advocacy for the poor. This is not entirely surprising, as in many cases, especially in 
formerly authoritarian countries, funding for the opposition groups dried up when 
democratic governments came in (Johannesburg and, to a lesser extent, SP). These 
organizations either dissolve or find ways to survive, the latter often by selling 
services. Some of these same NGOs lost their top cadres to the newly democratic 
governments, putting further at risk the ideals these organizations professed in the era 
of opposition. 
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Some intermediaries are more successful than others in promoting and 
accompanying institutional development and autonomy in urban grassroots 
organizations (Johannesburg, SP). 
Unfortunately, there are simply too few intermediary organizations capable of 
undertaking large-scale organizing and capacity-building of autonomous volunteer 
organizations in the vast slums and bidonvilles of many of the world’s megacities 
(Mumbai). 
Capacity of Volunteer Organizations 
Volunteer organizations, such as neighborhood associations, CBOs, mother’s 
clubs, housing cooperatives, and so forth typically draw their strength and material 
resources from within, that is, from their members. Thus an organization’s strength 
has much to do with the capacity of its individual members (see next section), its 
access to information and capacity-building (see previous section), and the possibility 
to exist and develop in a democratic way (i.e., without stifling regulation or repression 
from the government or inhospitable local forces). In all the cities studied this last 
condition was met. The grassroots organizations also typically had access to strong, 
civic-minded intermediaries. The capacity of the members was a problem, however, 
especially the individual’s ability to remain in a state of mobilization over the long 
term. The constraints acting at this level are described in the next section. 
Internal democracy is an acknowledged ideal for both NGOs and CBOs. For 
many of the grassroots organizations covered in the case studies, such ideals were 
sometimes honored more in their breach (Chicago, Mumbai, Johannesburg, Lima, and 
SP). This does not mean that the organizations did not have democratic impulses or 
goals, but rather that adverse conditions—such as changes in leadership, external 
political forces, or internal corruption—did at times divert the organization’s trajectory. 29 
The urban poor are rarely a homogenous lot. They can be highly stratified even 
in their vulnerability. This shows itself in the attitudes of different groups and in the 
community organizations that serve separate subsets of the poor. Among groups with 
different “vulnerability profiles” residing side by side, the most vulnerable will not 
necessarily benefit from the efforts of the groups representing the less vulnerable. In 
practice, relations between the groups can be highly conflicting. Such circumstances 
reduce the possibility of effective approaches to resolution of problems affecting both 
groups (Mumbai, Johannesburg). 
In politically fractious environments, and even when party politics across the 
spectrum have been completely discredited, volunteer organizations may become 
targets for capture by “political bosses” or leaders with political ambitions 
(Johannesburg, Lima, and SP). 
Community organizations of the urban poor can rarely access by themselves 
information needed to protect themselves and/or their neighborhood. Nor are they 
adequately prepared to interact publicly or privately with local authorities or to 
develop independently the kinds of analysis of the urban economy that will sway 
private developers or city agencies to protect the rights and interests of members of the 
low-income community. In these situations it is crucial for grassroots organizations to 
have access to reliable information and analysis from NGO or research institutes. 
The internal strength of community and volunteer organizations can be 
enhanced effectively if, in addition to access to strong intermediaries and information, 
they learn to “organize themselves to learn.” This means, among other things, 
becoming participants in action research, whereby they collect and analyze in 
progressively sophisticated ways the information needed to become effective 
advocates for change both within their community and in the larger society. 30 
Capacity of Individuals (Volunteers) 
Individuals in low-income communities who, because of the objective 
conditions of their lives have highly restricted mobility, chronic health problems, or 
extremely limited mental functions, may not be able to take an active role in public 
life. This is not unexpected. Nevertheless, this is a burden imposed unequally on the 
poorest populations. To this must be added the burden of violent or disaffected youth, 
criminal elements, and others who have been excluded from more positive social 
intercourse. A higher incidence of persons in these categories increases the number of 
“nonparticipants” in civic activities, as well as the burdens on those who might 
otherwise want to contribute, or contribute more. 
Related to the previous point, women, who are often the primary managers of 
“informal” urban settlements, share this burden disproportionately. This is a limiting 
factor on their ability to participate as fully as they would want and to acquire special 
skills that may advance overall volunteer contributions of women. 
In many low-income settlements, existing efforts by women to contribute have 
been undermined by the attitudes of their male partners/spouses and fellow community 
members. Women are still, in general, not granted equal status as civic actors in the 
community. The persistence of men’s unemancipated attitudes negatively affects the 
volunteer contribution in many communities. 
Youth have proven to be invaluable volunteers and civic actors when structures 
(organizations and activities) exist to channel their efforts. They are also among the 
most vulnerable members of society. Longstanding precarious economic and social 
conditions are clearly alienating many young people from taking up civic action (Lima, 
Johannesburg). 31 
Recommendations to Local Authorities for Enhancing the Effectiveness of 
Collaborations with Community Organizations 
The previous section offers a litany of factors that impede the establishment of 
fruitful collaborations between local authorities and community organizations. To 
improve the impact of such collaborations, all of the actors and institutions cited could 
usefully change certain aspects of their attitudes, behavior, and capacities. The full 
responsibility for promoting and compelling such changes cannot be placed entirely on 
local authorities. They can, only with great difficulty, bring about changes at the 
macro level, despite their increasing influence on social and economic conditions 
within their sub national regions. It may also be argued that it is not inherently the 
responsibility of local authorities to redress the weaknesses of community 
organizations within their geographical purview. Nor would it be wise to suggest that 
the local authority must improve the basic element of the community organizations—
the individual—by intervening inside the family to change patterns of relations or 
cultural practices that disproportionately benefit some members to the detriment of 
others. But there are areas in which local authorities can make important contributions, 
and these are the focus of this final section. 
These recommendations are those of the author, based on his understanding of 
the case studies, overview materials, and interaction with the main participants in the 
project over the past several years. The recommendations are, in effect, based on 
comparing and contrasting the conditions, achievements, and challenges that have 
been reported on in total. As such, these recommendations are generic, and hence 
apply everywhere and nowhere. Any attempt to apply them should be accompanied by 
a review of the individual studies in which recommendations are set clearly within 
local contexts. Limitations of space prevent further discussion of how international 
organizations, national governments, community organizations, and international 32 
NGOs can support the kinds of changes needed to bring about more fruitful 
collaborations between community organizations and local authorities. 
One of the main conclusions of this study is that local authorities play the 
determining role in urban grassroots development or, more correctly, in fostering 
social cohesion and development in cities and towns. But to be successful in these 
efforts they must ally themselves with community and city-wide institutions of civil 
society. Cities willing to do this may begin by examining the extent to which they 
accomplish the following: 
¾  Make publicly available in timely and easily accessible forms information 
concerning public budget decisions; investment and urban development plans; 
records of internal discussions on infrastructure locations, designs and 
technologies; and administrative and political boundary changes. 
¾  Allow substantive participation of community organizations in the planning, 
implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of policies and investments that 
significantly and differentially affect groups within the city. 
¾  Support open dialogue between local authorities and civil-society 
organizations (and among the latter) on these issues. 
¾  Provide a competent, motivated, and politically independent liaison service 
within the urban administration to respond to and inform CSOs on issues of 
concern to the public. 
¾  Promulgate and implement legislation and administrative regulations that 
institutionalize these characteristics of openness to CSOs, regardless of the 
change of important political or executive personnel within the local authority. 
¾  Promote awareness of the concerns of CSOs and a capacity for working with 
CSOs among employees at different levels of the urban administration. 33 
¾  Train CSO liaison personnel to be “women-friendly,” as many of the most 
important grassroots managers of low-income urban communities are wives 
and mothers. 
¾  Commit to acting as mediators of the public good, in which promoting and 
protecting the dignity of life for all residents is the first priority in decision 
making. 
Implementing even this short list of recommendations, which will necessarily 
have to be adapted to widely varying local conditions and histories, will require 
additional resources, new ways of thinking, and more autonomy for local authorities. 
This is happening in many cities, but not nearly enough. And the threats to progress 
already made loom ever larger: political and ethnic conflict, environmental collapse, 
increasing disease burdens, the scourge of drugs, disintegrating local economies, and 
so forth. It is therefore necessary to bolster reforms within local authorities with 
external support—not just monetary but moral, intellectual, and legislative. National 
governments, other local authorities, international cooperation, and local and 
international civil society, citizens, and business all have a part to play in this effort. 34 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
SELF-BUILT HOUSING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: 
CURRENT CONTRIBUTIONS AND CHALLENGES TO LOCAL 
DEVELOPMENT THROUGH VOLUNTEERISM 
Introduction 
This paper summarizes the literature describing the current and near-term 
challenges to improving the quality, quantity, and social impact of volunteer 
contributions to self-built housing in cities of developing countries. On the basis of 
this analysis it then suggests several approaches for providing institutional support to 
improve the impacts of these volunteer efforts. The paper was prepared for the United 
Nations Volunteers
1 as support to its project Support to Intra-City Volunteerism. 
This project “is based on the premise that volunteerism is still largely under-
utilized in (urban) development . . . [and] . . . is seldom fully recognized, promoted 
and supported by local authorities and by other urban policy- and decision-makers.” 
The terms of reference for the paper also note that 
Equally, the local volunteer sector is seldom organized in a fashion that would 
make the best of itself. The contribution of volunteerism to urban development 
could be much broader than what it is at present, if further support was given. 
The project aims at helping to expand such contribution, by (i) setting-up 
demonstration activities as well as (ii) an awareness raising campaign and (iii) 
technical assistance. The development of a knowledge base is crucial to these 
three objectives. 
The paper comprises four sections, not including this introduction. The first 
section describes what is meant by self-built housing in developing countries and the 
processes it encompassed during the postwar era. The second section assesses the 
                                                 
1 The United Nations Volunteers (UNV) is the only agency in the United Nations system with a 
mandate to promote, organize, and manage volunteer efforts in support of United Nations development 
goals.  37 
scale of self-building in developing countries and the living conditions it provides for 
the large majority of residents. The third section reviews different organizational 
typologies of self-built housing for low-income groups in urban areas of developing 
countries. This focuses on identifying the roles of different social actors, including 
volunteers, in a spectrum of approaches to self-building. The fourth section describes 
the major obstacles to the transformation of much self-built housing into adequate 
housing for the majority of its builders/residents. The final section has two parts. The 
first offers general prescriptions for overcoming the obstacles to transforming self-
built housing into adequate housing. The second discusses the idea of UNV’s 
promoting forms of self-building that lead to psychosocial and political 
transformations of individuals, groups, and communities that participate in self-
building processes. 
The information and opinions offered in this paper are drawn from a selective 
review of recent journal articles that discuss self-built housing or volunteerism and 
urban upgrading in developing and developed countries. The research also benefited 
from a review of case studies of self-built housing in the UNCHS Best Practices 
Database. I also draw on studies of self-built housing I commissioned under the 
auspices of the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), 
and on my experience as an advisor to an NGO in Buenos Aires, Argentina, that 
promotes income-generation and decent housing for low-income groups through 
microenterprise development.
2 
Self-Built Urban Housing in the Global South 
For the purposes of this paper, self-built or self-help housing is the product of a 
range of activities leading to the design, construction, maintenance, and management 
                                                 
2 The name of the NGO is Microenergia. Information about its work may be found at 
http://www.microenergia.net. 38 
of the physical structure and immediate surroundings of permanent shelter for human 
beings. Self-help housing also includes renovations, alterations, or adaptations of 
existing buildings, including tenements, industrial spaces, or other structures that have 
not been occupied for lengthy periods and whose new residents or others working with 
them undertake the improvements. Regardless of the nature of the structure, self-help 
housing would normally, if not at the moment of first habitation, entail eventual 
provisioning of clean water, sanitation, and energy within the shelter or within 
convenient reach of the structure. This expansive definition of self-built housing 
follows from that of “adequate housing” as pursued as a human right established and 
elaborated over time by the United Nations in the Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ESCR). So, while not all self-built housing achieves on-premises 
services such as these, they must be considered as an eventual—but still pressing—
goal of the process. Without them, particularly in densely inhabited urban settlements, 
not only are the physical and social well-being of the residents of the self-help 
structure put at risk by exposure to environmental pathogens or other health-
endangering conditions, so too are those of their neighbors and the surrounding 
community.
3 
The literature describing modern processes of self-built housing (and 
communities) in urbanizing areas of developing countries is nearly as old as the 
process of modern urbanization. This literature will not be reviewed in detail here, 
only summarized in a way that might accurately describe some of the most typical 
aspects of the peri-urbanization process. 
                                                 
3 The working definition of the right to adequate housing currently applied by the United Nations 
Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living is 
as follows: “the right of every woman, man, youth and child to gain and sustain a secure home and 
community in which to live in peace and dignity.” In his efforts to promote the realization of this right, 
the Special Rapporteur has “followed a holistic approach, based on the reality that all human rights are 
interrelated and indivisible. The right to adequate housing cannot be fully realized if separated [from] 
with other rights such as the rights to food, water, sanitation, electricity, health, work, property, security 
of the person, security of home, and protection against inhuman and degrading treatment” (Kothari). 39 
New arrivals to the city would typically lodge with a friend or relation with 
connections to the new arrival’s home place. After sharing or renting housing for a 
period in order to save money and make appropriate plans for establishing his/her own 
home, the new migrant would join with a group of other would-be settlers in a more-
or-less organized takeover of vacant/unused property. Takeovers like this could be on 
public or private property, within the boundaries of the city or well outside it, but 
usually not on land already undergoing formal development processes. More typically, 
the land suffered multiple hazards for occupancy: high susceptibility to industrial 
pollution or natural disaster (flooding, seismic activity, wildfires, etc.) or nearly 
insurmountable obstacles to the provisioning of necessary services (absence of sources 
of drinking water, location on steep rocky slopes or shifting sands, etc.). Occupation of 
land took place under cover of night. By morning a series of makeshift huts stood in 
close proximity, offering a semblance of self-protection and an important degree of 
solidarity. Large-scale land invasions and subsequent settlements could often depend 
on external assistance in achieving a degree of legitimacy, if not legality, for newly 
settled communities. Local politicians found them to be useful vote banks; progressive 
NGOs and church-based organizations found them to be viable alternatives to 
overcrowding in existing urban slums or worse conditions in communities that had 
managed to grow entirely spontaneously through multiple and uncoordinated 
invasions.
4 
                                                 
4 Modern urbanization in developing countries refers to the post–World War II era, during which 
decolonization and nation-building processes often included industrialization programs. New industry, 
typically located in the major cities, encouraged rural workers to migrate to the cities in search of higher 
wages, better physical amenities, and access to health care, education, cultural facilities, etc. In some 
countries, modernization of agriculture served to push unemployed peasants to the city. With these 
processes, urban population began growing faster than total population. Although initially migration 
often led to overcrowding and degradation of existing urban housing stock, housing within the existing 
city boundaries reached capacity and soon became too expensive for most rural migrants. Increasingly, 
they were to settle on the periphery of the major cities, in many cases occupying vast tracts of lands 
more than double the area within the city’s formal boundaries. More recently, such areas became know 
as peri-urban settlements. A sampling of the vernacular names for these include pueblos jovenes, 
colonias, gecekondus, bidonvilles, favelas, shanty towns, squatter settlements, villas de miseria, katchi 40 
Over decades some peri-urban settlements consolidated as both housing and 
connections to urban infrastructure and services improved. Families with steady 
incomes gradually replaced the temporary materials of their first structures: walls of 
brick and mortar for tin or cardboard, paving or tiles for mud floors, glass windows for 
oiled paper or plastic sheeting, and doors with locks for a sheet of hanging canvas. 
More prosperous settlements and/or those with better political connections got paved 
roads linking them to metropolitan transportation networks, urban services (water, 
power, sanitation, and refuse collection), and social and cultural facilities (education, 
health, recreation). Indeed, some of these successful self-upgraded communities are 
now mature enough that homes built with the original permanent materials are now 
reaching the stage of becoming dangerous because of aging materials and overbuilding 
on poorly designed or constructed supports. 
Other neighborhoods did not prosper, or did so only selectively. Nor did they 
become fully integrated into urban transportation and infrastructure networks. These 
may have grown large enough to be officially recognized as slums. Some were 
enveloped within the formal
5 city that expanded as the upper and upper-middle classes 
established new neighborhoods, commercial centers, and recreation facilities to cater 
to their needs in the cleaner and greener suburbs. The fact remains, however, that 
today some 43 percent of urbanites in developing countries live in slums (UN Habitat 
2003:vi).
6 
                                                                                                                                              
abadis, chawls, kampungs, etc. A fuller list of vernacular names for slums by region can be found in 
UNHSP (2003:10). 
5 The “formal city” is that part of the urban area that adheres to planning regulations and building codes 
and is fully serviced with modern transport, sanitation, refuse collection, drinking water, energy, etc.  
6 In many cities, the term “slum” is an official designation, defined and applied by the local 
government. In certain instances, the term may be selectively applied depending on some minimum 
number of households or area covered by substandard housing. This would therefore not necessarily 
enumerate all substandard living situations in a city, and perhaps would result in higher estimates of the 
population living in substandard housing if housing in nondesignated slum areas were enumerated. 41 
Because no consistent records are kept on the number of houses that are “self-
built” or the proportion of the total urban residential building stock that they occupy, a 
proxy variable is needed to estimate the extent of population living in self-built 
housing. From this, one may then draw some conclusions about the probable 
“quantum” of volunteer effort that must be invested in self-building in order to keep 
roofs over the heads of families who have no other means of protecting themselves 
from the elements. Furthermore, it would be possible to calculate the monetary value 
of such effort both in terms of de facto family savings and contribution to GDP. This 
latter computation is beyond the scope of this study, but may well be taken up by 
UNV at a later point when seeking to influence government policy toward support for 
self-help/self-built housing. 
The proxy variable I have chosen to estimate the importance of volunteer 
efforts in self-built housing is the number of persons living in slums. We will see that 
current efforts to define slums in a way that will allow cross-city and cross-national 
comparisons should yield a reasonable estimate of populations living in self-built 
housing. Also, because the stock of dilapidated formal housing in the traditional center 
city is decreasing as a result of gentrification or clearance for nonresidential uses and 
because of stricter regulation and policing of central-city areas, new slums will 
increasingly be found in peri-urban areas. These will be largely constructed by the 
inhabitants themselves, with or without contributions from informal laborers living 
nearby. 
While not all residences in urban slums house the poor and not all slum 
residences are poorly constructed and maintained, current research reveals that slums 
rarely meet minimum standard of “adequate housing” as defined by the United 
Nations. Based on a review of definitions used by local governments, statistical offices, 
institutions dealing with slum issues and public perceptions, UNHSP (United Nations 42 
Human Settlements Programme)
7 compiled the following list of characteristics 
describing slums: 
♦  Area lacks basic services (clean water, sanitation, energy) 
♦  Housing/building structures substandard or located in illegal sites, structures 
inadequate 
♦  Housing overcrowded (as many as 5 persons in one room unit) 
♦  Unhealthy living conditions and hazardous locations (open sewers, 
uncontrolled dumping of waste, polluted environments, etc. or in areas subject 
to natural hazards) 
♦  Insecure tenure (absence of legal document entitling occupant to use of site) 
♦  Irregular or informal settlements (do not follow land-use plans) 
♦  High levels of poverty and social exclusion 
♦  Minimum settlement size. (UNHSP 2003:11) 
UNHSP further notes that conditions such as these “ . . . are physical and 
statutory manifestations that create barriers to human and social development.” Thus, 
as discussed later in the paper, under certain conditions self-building can be a way of 
transforming slums into communities where these barriers are significantly dismantled. 
Finding and supporting these “certain” conditions should therefore be one of the aims 
of national and international technical assistance as well as aid programs, especially 
with respect to self-help housing. 
In an effort to devise a more workable means to estimate the number of 
persons living in slums, a United Nations Expert Group proposed in October 2002 an 
                                                 
7 UN Center for Human Settlements (UNCHS), UN Habitat, and UN Human Settlements Programme 
(UNHSP) are names for the same United Nations family organization concerned with urban 
settlements. The change in the name and acronym of the organization over the years reflects subtle 
changes in the governance arrangements within the UN rather than in the nature of the institution’s 
mandate.  43 
operational definition based on a reduced set of indicators reflecting the following: 
lack of access to safe water, sanitation, and other infrastructure; poor structural quality 
of housing; overcrowding; and insecure residential status. By this tentative method, 
UNHSP arrived at an estimate of 31.6 percent of the world’s urban population living 
in inadequate conditions. For developing countries, the UNHSP’s estimate is 43 
percent, or about 870 million people (UNHSP 2003:12–13). Compared with an 
estimate of the slum population in developing countries for 1975 (Madavo), the 
increase during the 26 intervening years was more than 400 percent.
8 
This suggests that at least 4 out of every 10 urban residents in developing 
countries lives in self-built housing that in one aspect or another is inadequate. In other 
words, 4 of every 10 are exposed to physical conditions that are known to be harmful 
to human beings. UNHSP further concludes, on the basis of urban growth rates and 
declining rates of public investment in or other supports to low-income housing, that 
slum populations are likely to be growing rather than remaining stable or shrinking 
and that overall conditions in many cities are worsening as globalization reduces the 
supply of formal sector employment and tightens the belt around redistributive 
mechanisms. 
It is because of these dire trends that actions must be taken to support poor 
people’s efforts to house themselves adequately. To do so will require strategic 
investments by governments, international organizations, local and international 
NGOs, and the people themselves. The rest of this paper will focus on developing an 
understanding of self-built/self-help housing that may assist UNV in identifying its 
strategic, if not unique, contribution to this effort. 
                                                 
8 This estimate of change is “very approximate” as neither the definitions of slum populations used for 
these two years (1975 and 2001) nor the data collection systems were the same.  44 
Approaches to Self-Built Housing 
Today, individuals and families whose incomes are too low to allow them to 
rent or buy shelter must either borrow accommodations, share it with others, live in 
the open, or construct their own shelter. This last choice can be accomplished in 
different ways, ranging from stretching a sheet of canvas from an existing structure 
over a sidewalk space to joining a spontaneous invasion of a piece of open land and in 
the course of an evening assembling cardboard, tin, and wire into rough shack. Still 
others  join groups of families in need of housing and organize themselves to occupy a 
piece of land that they hope to establish tenure on, first by constructing a rudimentary 
dwelling and then inhabiting it for a long period. Increasingly more frequent today, 
groups such as these align themselves with voluntary organizations that belong to the 
local and/or national housing movement. 
The contribution of these organizations to the self-housing process may be 
simple or complicated. For example, the voluntary organization may simply channel 
homeless people to an open spot that may be ripe for invasion. Or one or more 
voluntary organizations may participate in an ongoing technical assistance process that 
includes organizing homeless people into a “social entity” in which some basic 
aspirations (for housing) and rules about achieving them collectively are agreed upon 
by all participants as a condition of membership in the group and eventual access to 
housing. In the more formalized cases, prospective “occupiers” agree to meet regularly 
before occupying land to keep abreast of developments in the environment for 
occupations, to organize crucial on-site tasks prior to the initial occupation of land, 
and to rehearse scenarios that might occur during the early phases of occupation. 
Members such as these will often pay dues into a common fund and keep track of 
attendance at group activities as a means of establishing seniority for land and housing 
assignments or other benefits that may be established for steady participation. 45 
Once self-builders have occupied land, voluntary groups and for-profit 
organizations may assist them by helping to organize and carry out tasks such as 
security, fire protection, child care, and education, and to acquire skills necessary to 
participate fully in the construction, management, and maintenance of structures and 
community facilities desired by the “invaders,” and so forth. 
In some cases, most notably in and around the city and State of São Paulo 
beginning in the late 1980s, homeless families organized by and working with 
voluntary organizations were able to negotiate with municipalities for access to state-
controlled land for their nascent cooperatives. This happened predominately in cities 
led by mayors from left-wing political parties, especially the Worker’s Party.
9 
In some cases these residents’ organizations formalize themselves as housing 
cooperatives. In other cases, residents take over empty buildings in built-up zones of 
cities, where they may or may not “habilitate” the structure for human occupancy 
and/or establish forms of internal management and government. This is generally 
considered to be “squatting.” Nonetheless, it is a strategy that may lead not only to 
access to housing, but to improvements and true rehabilitation of the existing structure 
by the squatters. 
Because of technical and financial constraints, urban self-building has 
generally been limited to structures not taller than three stories. However, there are 
examples in China, Yemen, Mali, and many other developing countries where 
traditional construction technology and materials have been used successfully in 
structures of six stories and more for hundreds of years (see Figure 2.1). Modern self-
building experiences in urban settings have even begun to achieve these heights.
10 
                                                 
9 The history of these experiences in the City of São Paulo is complex and riven with political intrigue. 
For an excellent case study of one such experience, see Rolnik (1997, 2003). 
10 The problem has not been the absence of building technologies that allow self-builders to go higher, 
but the willingness of urban administrations who have contributed funds to multistory projects to allow 
public resources to be used to hire the equipment and specialized labor needed to build safely above 
three stories. See Rolnik (1997, 2003). 46 
a) b) 
 
c) 
Figure 2.1. Examples of Self-Built Housing of Six or More Stories. a) Fujian, 
China; b) Alkwa, Mali; c) Bab El, Yemen. 
Aims of Self-Built Housing: More than Shelter 
As noted at the beginning of this report, self-help housing has the potential to 
fulfill a range of societal functions. The most important and immediate of these is to 
provide shelter. But eventually it must integrate a range of services and environmental 
characteristics that meet the United Nations criteria of adequate housing. Second, by 
participating in self-help construction and eventual management of community assets 
and services, residents of previously marginalized groups may acquire skills, create 
employment, and acquire equity in a home that would be difficult to duplicate under 
other circumstances. Third, depending on how the self-help-building community 
organizes and manages itself, the process may promote among participants the 
capacity for self-reliance, an understanding of socially and environmentally sound 47 
living, and high levels of affection for the physical community because public and 
private spaces embody evidence of the creativity and pride of the community. Under 
ideal circumstances, achievement of these broad aims creates a strong political 
consciousness among residents that reflects itself in an active solidarity with other 
members of society’s marginalized groups.
11 In effect, for members of society’s most 
marginalized groups, the self-building process at its best transforms people whose 
capacity to take public-spirited action has heretofore been limited by the material 
conditions of their lives (inadequate habitat, employment, income, and self-confidence, 
both individually and collectively). 
It is therefore valuable to establish 
♦  what forms of self-building best tend to achieve all these objectives, and 
♦  how best to promote such forms of self-help building and the volunteer efforts 
they comprise. 
To do so, it is first necessary to review some of the principal roles that 
volunteers play in the different self-building processes and then to identify the main 
obstacles to achieving the multiple goals of self-built housing. These are discussed in 
the next two sections, respectively. 
Volunteer Contributions to Self-Built Housing 
Volunteer roles have been enumerated in the literature on self-building to 
reflect the size, procedures, and “in-kind” contributions of persons participating in the 
process. Typically, in-kind contributions have been motivated either by necessity to 
                                                 
11 During a review of studies prepared for presentation at Habitat II, researchers of the joint UNRISD-
UNV action research project Volunteer Action and Local Democracy: Partnership for a Better Urban 
Future agreed that an apt definition of a “volunteer” must include that s/he as a minimum condition 
possessed the health, time, and mental capacity to decide of her/his free will to undertake an act of 
solidarity (Kumburgaz, Turkey 26–29 May 1996). 48 
secure housing by those in need, or by others not necessarily in need of housing but 
who wish to act in solidarity with those who do. The motivations and actions of these 
two sets of volunteers should be understood clearly. Not least among the reasons for 
doing so is that they mutually influence the effectiveness of each other’s efforts. 
Moreover, it may be argued that access to adequate housing is a necessary 
precondition for some individuals to be able to act on instincts of solidarity. It may be 
further argued—and there appears to be anecdotal evidence to support this—that the 
will to undertake public-spirited action may be awakened through a well-conceived 
and implemented self-building process. 
Different approaches to self-building entail different physical, social, and 
political processes and fulfill different sets of human needs. These range from merely 
solving temporarily the need for physical shelter to the progressive fulfillment of the 
right to adequate housing, employment, and participation in decisions affecting one’s 
family and community. 
Table 2.1 lists the principle roles that “volunteers” play in a range of self-
building processes. The schematic consists of five different forms or styles of self-help 
housing processes: the spontaneous individualistic process, the facilitated individual 
process, the facilitated collective process, the comprehensively organized and 
facilitated collective process, and the comprehensive mutual-assistance cooperative 
process.
12 The roles listed in the table are those that appeared with some consistency 
in a selection of self-help-housing case studies compiled in the latter half of the 1990s 
either as part of the UNCHS Best Practices Program or in my own research projects 
with UNRISD. The List of Best Practice cases reviewed is found in Appendix 1. 
                                                 
12 Between adjacent pairs of the five self-help housing processes listed there are many gradations and 
variants. The five discussed in this paper form major categories, and there is at least one major 
difference between them. This schema reflects the link between increasing complexity of the planned 
self-help process and the comprehensiveness of the change expected from it. This table limits itself to 
the construction of shelter rather than to the takeover or “squatting” of an existing structure. The latter, 
though important in some cities, is far less common in most cities of the developing world.  49 
Table 2.1. Volunteer Roles and Actors in Self-Built Housing 
  Forms of self-building processes 
Activities Spontaneous 
Individual 
Facilitated 
Individual 
(e.g., sites 
& services)
Facilitated 
Collective 
(e.g., sites 
& services)
Comprehensively 
Organized & 
Facilitated 
Collective 
Comprehensive 
Mutual 
Assistance 
Cooperative 
Site identification  I  N/S  N/S  N/S/P  N 
Site preparation  I  I/S/P N/S/P  N/S/P N/S 
Materials acquisition/ 
fabrication 
I I  I N/S/P  N/G 
Construction of first 
shelter 
I I  I  I  N/G 
Self-defense/policing I  I  I/G  I/G  G 
Child-care   I  I  I/G  I/G  G 
Permitting I  I  I  I  N/G 
Construction training  NA  NA  NA  N  N/G 
Design of shelter and 
common facilities 
NA NA  NA  N/P  N/G/P 
Organizational 
development of 
community groups 
NA NA  NA  N/S  N/G 
Management of 
construction 
NA NA  NA  N  G 
Materials and site 
management 
NA NA  NA  N  G 
Bookkeeping and 
financial management 
NA NA  NA  N  G 
Government relations NA  NA  NA  G/N/S  G 
Community self-
management 
NA NA  NA  G  G 
  
Key:  I = Individual or family self-builder 
  G = Self-organized/Grassroots group  
  N = NGO, inc. University or Church affiliated groups, unions 
  S = Government, public authority/agency (any level) 
  P = Private sector 
  NA = Not Applicable   
 
In the spontaneous individual process the family in need of housing plays 
almost all the volunteer roles. It identifies a location where building a shelter appears 50 
feasible and where the risk of being removed immediately at high material cost to 
oneself is acceptable. The family then collects and transports building materials to the 
site, clears it for construction, and rapidly assembles a rudimentary structure there. 
Gaining permission to remain on the site, either from the legal private or public owner 
or from a de facto local boss, remains the sole responsibility of the family. Protecting 
the family and property, provisioning water, sanitation, and energy, and subsequent 
structural upgrading then become the daily concern of the newly housed family. 
Collective efforts to accomplish any of these objectives can be undertaken only if 
some form of mutual assistance can be agreed upon among co-settlers. In the absence 
of an external organizing force, whether mutual assistance among settlers within close 
proximity to one another will eventually become the basis for community organization 
and neighborhood decision making depends greatly on the personal characteristics of 
the settlers. Deep poverty and heterogeneity of language and culture among settlers 
often retards this process.  
In the facilitated individual process, such as sites and services projects, some 
of the initial burdens of settlement are lightened by the participation of government 
authorities and/or NGOs. This is particularly beneficial when it reduces the time 
needed to search for an appropriate site, and when the site has been cleared and 
provided with minimal essential services. Still, mutual assistance for self-protection, 
structural and service upgrading, and collective decision making will be left to the will 
of the settlers. 
In the facilitated collective process, settlers receive the same benefits as in the 
facilitated individual process. The main difference is that in the latter case, settlers 
arrive at the site as members of a group. As such, they may have already received 
guidance about how to organize mutual assistance for self-defense, day-care services 
for families needing it, construction and environmental upgrading, and relations with 51 
representatives of the owner/political bosses concerned. The main benefit, however, 
may rest with the moral support that derives from a sense of belonging to a group and 
knowing that in moments of difficulty, there is someone nearby to turn to for help. 
The degree of cohesiveness of the group and the quality of its leadership may 
vary widely. In some cases, NGOs or the local authority assemble prospective settlers 
into an association of sorts with the aim of making it easier to assist a group that can 
internally provide mutual assistance, a range of skills, and economies of scale to the 
construction process, for example. But a newly formed group is less likely to function 
harmoniously than one that has been planning its settlement process for a long time. 
The comprehensively assisted and organized collective process (hereafter, 
comprehensive collective) differs from the simpler forms because public, private, and 
community actors may be involved in working with prospective settlers on all aspects 
of planning for the self-building process as well as in later phases including 
construction, site management, and even organizational development, housing finance, 
upgrading of service access, and so forth. Compared with the simpler forms of self-
building, the comprehensive collective form involves an expanded role for outside 
actors and reflects a higher degree of commitment on the part of government and/or 
social organizations to sustaining a process of improvement in the newly settled area. 
In some of the most formalized processes, the community organization incorporates 
itself as a not-for-profit entity through which it can receive and disburse resources 
from the government, sign business contracts, and represent community interests 
before courts and government administrative units. 
A special and noteworthy case of the comprehensive collective form is the 
comprehensive mutual-assistance cooperative. In some of the most advanced 
examples of this form of self-building, prospective settlers have worked extensively 
with NGOs to establish functioning resident committees and a self-governing body 52 
from well before the physical settlement process begins. The purpose of the pre-
settlement organizational development is to instill in the settlers an understanding of 
democratic processes that will guide them through the countless decisions that will 
arise regularly during the development of their physical and social community. These 
close links to NGOs in the housing movements or to trade unions and even municipal 
authorities may continue long after the construction is complete: experienced 
personnel from one cooperative project may be called upon to assist in the formation 
or training of new cooperatives, or to help draft legislation supportive of cooperative 
housing development. 
According to the UNCHS 2001 Global Report on Human Settlements, housing 
cooperatives have the “potential to provide low-income households with improved 
access to adequate housing because they: 
♦  facilitate the pooling of resources and lower individual housing costs 
♦  foster collective action and self-help 
♦  increase creditworthiness 
♦  limit or prevent speculation. (2001:208–9) 
UNCHS then attributed this institutional potential to the cooperative’s 
governance principles of collective ownership and democratic management.
13 
Some of the most successful and varied forms of mutual-assistance housing 
cooperatives began appearing in Uruguay in the mid-1960s. Were they not rigorously 
suppressed by the military government between 1973 and 1985, the mutual-assistance 
cooperative housing movement might be far more widespread today than it is. 
                                                 
13 See detailed case studies demonstrating how these principles have influenced individual housing 
cooperatives in Montevideo, Uruguay  and in São Paulo (Rolnik 1998, 2003) and Fortaleza (2001), 
Brazil. 53 
Nonetheless, the Uruguayan experience has been successful enough to inspire housing 
movements throughout Latin America. 
This success also owed much to strong partnerships between local authorities, 
CBOs, and NGOs, especially in Montevideo. The NGO FUCVAM, established in 
1970, has provided continuous technical assistance to Uruguayan cooperatives by 
developing innovative construction methods, materials, and material production 
processes; providing training to grassroots communities, policy advice to government, 
as well as advocacy with the public and other services. Throughout the 1990s 
Montevideo’s municipal government was led by an architect whose earlier 
professional life involved him in the cooperative housing movement. Because of his 
confidence in the validity of the mutual-assistance cooperative housing model, he  
used his influence to establish a municipal “land bank,’” the aim of which was to 
acquire and hold land and buildings within the core city that could be developed by 
mutual assistance cooperatives of very low-income residents. By doing so, it saves the 
prospective cooperative from having to search for and buy land on their own—a truly 
daunting if not impossible task organizationally and financially for the city’s low-
income residents. Then, when a cooperative is sufficiently mature to begin 
construction or renovation on the property, the city sells it to the cooperative. 
The cooperative purchases the property with the proceeds of a loan equal to the 
construction costs, minus 15 percent, which is calculated as the value of mutual aid 
labor. Some of the special characteristics of Uruguay’s mutual assistance 
characteristics are described in the following section. 54 
Mutual Assistance Cooperative Housing in Uruguay: Much more than a 
house . . .  
Mutual assistance cooperative housing in Uruguay has demonstrated a range of 
socially valuable practices and outcomes. Not least among these would be reducing 
overall costs by 20 percent while delivering a better-designed and more comfortable 
home than available for the same price in the private market; managing to reuse or 
recycle large portions of construction materials, equipment, and architectural 
finishings when rehabilitating existing structures; maximizing the use of 
nonspecialized labor throughout the construction process; creating public spaces that 
are better-appreciated and cared-for than in public and many private housing 
complexes; sustaining themselves financially even for low-income groups, and so 
forth. Those intimately involved in assisting these processes argue, however, that such 
successes are achieved and sustained and further enhanced over time because of the 
social processes that take place during the formation of the cooperative and the 
construction of its physical premises: 
The Uruguayan experience of mutual-aid cooperative housing is inseparably 
linked to self-organisation and grass-roots participation, as well as to the 
application of fundamental cooperative principles—in the organizational 
structure, in the building process and in the proposal of community-oriented 
social development. 
It promotes values such as solidarity, democracy, and mutual respect, 
which are different and even opposed to those of individualism and 
competition, currently prevailing in modern societies. Mutual aid, which 
implies the joint effort of every beneficiary family, not only of those acting as 
leaders of the group, is a fundamental factor for the consolidation of those 
values. That is why even if it were possible to omit mutual aid as an economic 
necessity in order to reduce housing costs, it is important to retain it as a way 
to strengthen these values. 
Moreover, the cooperation and self-help capacities achieved in this process are 
later transferred to different levels to fulfil other family and community needs, 
through the cooperative itself or by other forms of popular organisations 55 
initiated within the cooperative movement. Cooperatives have thus fostered, 
either through their own actions or by seeking both state and community 
intervention, solutions to the widest range of problems. 
These include: 
Basic services: urban infrastructure (water, sewage disposal, electricity, home 
waste collection, transportation), culture (kindergartens and primary schools, 
day-care centres, public libraries, artistic activities, sports and recreational 
facilities), health (multipurpose community clinics, preventive medicine, 
dental and psychological assistance) and food (public meals, consumers’ 
cooperatives) through community-managed programs. 
Solidarity networks: Community support to families affected by 
temporary social or economic hardship (unemployment, labour strikes, and—
during the past dictatorship period—also political repression). This is related to 
the so-called “relief fund” (fondo de socorro), constituted in each cooperative 
with monthly contributions from the members themselves, another token of 
mutual aid. 
Non-formal education: Functioning of the cooperative as a social and 
economic enterprise calls for a permanent effort on the part of its members to 
attain cooperative education and training, beginning with the constituent stage 
and extending to the building and community living process. This permanent 
requirement for training and integration of knowledge and experience acts as a 
genuine school of systematic education.”
14 
The next section selectively reviews the literature on the factors that have 
prevented self-help housing from becoming a solution to the urban housing crisis in 
the developing world. 
                                                 
14 Quoted from http://www.rosalux.de/engl/projects/international/Central_America/athenaeum.htm. 
Original source is FUCVAM Habitat II Presentation. 
http://www.wisc.edu/uwcc/icic/today/housing/Uruguay--Housing--Self-Management--Commu1.html 
accessed 18 Feb 2004. Uruguay: Housing, Self-Management, Community Empowerment: The Coop 
Experience 56 
Obstacles to Successful Self-Help Housing 
For a family whose only choice in realizing its right to adequate housing is 
through self-building, there are many obstacles to success. These may influence the 
family’s chances of success directly and others indirectly. In rapid succession, if not 
always simultaneously, the family must cope with challenges to the four attributes of 
adequate housing: affordability, livability, security, and sustainability. The following 
paragraphs identify these challenges. 
Affordability is principally determined by the cost of accessing land on which 
to build, acquiring building materials and tools, hiring additional labor/technology if 
needed, and acquiring skills in construction, among other things, needed to establish a 
first rudimentary shelter. 
With the exception of the most precariously habitable urban land, most self-
builders do not immediately purchase the land on which they build their homes. More 
often than not, “the largest single urban land tenure category in many developing 
countries is that of extra-legal land developments. These include a wide range of land 
development practices, from squatting and unauthorized sub-divisions, to the 
construction on registered land of houses that have not been officially sanctioned” 
(DPU 2002:128). But central-city land that can be accessed by these forms of tenure 
are ever more rare.
15 The high and rising cost of land in these areas, which are now 
almost universally scheduled for their “highest usage” because of the reform and 
privatization of urban land markets, prevents legal use by the neediest groups. As a 
result, as noted earlier, new self-built settlements tend to be peri-urban, and tenure 
questions are initially left unsettled and thus precarious. 
                                                 
15 In 1996 UNCHS (244) pointed out that the commercialization of formal and informal urban land 
markets was causing an increasing concentration of low-income groups on a small proportion of the 
land area. Already by 1987, the wealthiest 2 percent of Dhaka’s residents occupied the same amount of 
the city’s residential area as the poorest 70 percent. The poorest 2.8 million of Dhaka’s residents lived 
on seven square kilometers of land (Islam 1992, quoted in UNCHS 1996:242).  57 
Even rudimentary building materials in metropolitan areas have become 
relatively more expensive for self-builders in recent decades (Ward:5).
16 At the same 
time, new materials, production processes, and low-cost building designs have been 
developed. These can reduce overall construction costs while improving the quality of 
homes for self-builders. However, some of these may be better suited for disaster 
relief than for more usual self-building in peri-urban areas if capital-intensive mass-
production techniques are employed or if the design of the structure is not well suited 
to local cultural practices. 
Various studies beginning with early works by Turner assumed that self-
builders are resourceful enough to build their own homes or to hire others to do all or 
part of the job for them. In more recent situations where single mothers or other self-
builders with no construction experience have joined self-building processes, NGOs or 
CBOs have been important in transferring skills to these groups. The existence and 
quality of the training these groups can give, or their role in arranging the bartering of 
other services (e.g., child care, food preparation and serving, grounds-keeping, night 
security, etc.) for construction labor can thus be an important factor. The complete 
absence of access to such training, on the other hand, is a significant obstacle for 
builders. This situation has become more apparent in major metropolitan areas where 
the high costs of land for self-building have necessitated more and more vertical 
construction, that is, the construction of apartment blocks of four or more stories in 
height. 
                                                 
16 I have not found references to systematic research on this question. Nonetheless, the high degree of 
competition that now exists in the formal and informal recycling sector in metropolitan areas of 
developing countries suggests that scavenging for one’s own makeshift materials would not be easy for 
a nonprofessional (for more on this competition, see Rolnik and Cymbalista 2003). At the same time, 
many building materials that are fabricated from tradable commodities are likely to have increased as 
well by virtue of their integration into formal processing and trade channels, many of which imply the 
influence of international standards and pricing. 58 
A groundbreaking example of this began in São Paulo, Brazil, in the early 
1990s. In one case, the Apuaña mutirao was forced to adopt a design of four stories. 
Special equipment and highly skilled laborers were needed to carry out certain aspects 
of construction. After evaluation of the costs and skills that would be required to 
complete the work, the architectural NGO assisting the community trained residents to 
build parts of the foundation that would have otherwise required specialized workers 
at a high cost to the community. But other tasks that could be carried out by the 
community had to be hired in. First, however, the NGO, working with residents and 
the local government, had to obtain special permission to use public funds—intended 
only for the purchase of construction materials—to hire special equipment and 
operators. Even more recently, self-builders have begun to press for access to 
abandoned apartment buildings in city centers. In situations where main structural 
elements or the electrical, water, or sanitation systems have deteriorated seriously, 
rehabilitation of the buildings requires, again, more skilled labor than the average first-
time self-builder could manage. Similarly, Ward has suggested that renovation of 
continuously expanded permanent structures dating from three or four decades ago 
may also be more complicated than building the original core structure ( Turner; 
Rolnik & Cymbalista; and Ward.) 
Once a rudimentary shelter is established, the struggle for livability ensues. 
This entails elaborating a permanent structure that is both strong enough and designed 
in a way to permit safe habitation during normal and extreme weather experienced in 
the locality. This concept also implies sufficient space adequately divided, ventilation, 
and access to clean water, sanitation, and energy, such that young and old, male and 
female live in conditions that do not jeopardize their physical or psychological 
development or well-being. 59 
Affordability issues may also affect livability to the extent that they block 
accession to or evidence of tenure. If legal evidence of secure tenure can be neither 
purchased nor rented, self-builder households will find it difficult to borrow money to 
upgrade their homes, such as to cover the large expenditures for one-time capital costs 
of connecting to city water and sanitation systems. On the other hand, even if tenure 
were affordable in principle, cumbersome regulations, high fees, or illegal charges 
encountered during efforts to register tenure may raise the costs of this process beyond 
affordability, or to a level that effectively prevents residents from upgrading their 
structures in a timely way. Regulations pertaining to urban planning (zoning, land use, 
etc.) and administration (features of buildings and lots, approval procedures for 
expansions or additions to structures) also have proven to increase costs and slow 
processes by which residents legally improve their property.
17 
Gilbert (2000) and others have described the additional problem of financing 
for self-built housing, particularly from the formal sector. Although governments have 
not generally been involved in massive-scale lending to self-help housers, in recent 
years they have been scaling back on their investments in public or low-income 
housing. This, along with the impacts of weakening economies in many developing 
countries in the 1990s, will have increased the pressure on existing affordable 
housing.
18 
Formal private-sector institutions have not shown interest in the self-help 
housing market, usually for several reasons: First, lenders are biased toward completed 
                                                 
17 This paragraph is based on Payne (2002). 
18 An ongoing study on the housing situation in Rosario, Argentina, shows that middle- and upper-
middle-class families, having been seriously affected by the economic downturn in their city over the 
past half-decade, have been moving from solid, central-city locations, to in-fill neighborhoods between 
the core city and its less-well-off inner peripheral neighborhoods. Until the late 1990s, the in-fill 
neighborhoods held little appeal for the middle class but hold greater appeal today because they afford 
acceptable levels of access to the city center but without the high land and housing costs (Salgado and 
Woeflin). 60 
owner-occupied housing—loans for rental or condominium housing, or for house 
improvements or unfinished core houses on serviced sites, are rare. Second, mortgage 
lenders find it difficult to verify self-employment incomes of low-income community 
members. Third, lenders do not trust poor people to repay their loans. Fourth, lenders 
are put off by the low profitability on small loans. At the same time, significant 
amounts of microcredit issued through NGOs have yet to find their way into the self-
building market. It seems most of these resources have been directed to working-
capital loans for enterprises in the form of frequent, small amounts. Typically such 
loans are well below the size of funds needed for housing (Ferguson, cited in Gilbert 
2000:167). 
Closely connected in time and necessity to the issue of livability is that of 
security: security of tenure; security against crime, violence, anomie, and social 
exclusion; security against natural and man-made disasters. There now appears to be a 
general consensus among urban-development professionals, whether working in city 
governments, international agencies, or NGOs, that secure tenure extended broadly 
across a community is the bedrock on which self-building can proceed from shelter to 
decent housing and long-term community development. Without secure tenure, 
residents’ sense of insecurity prevents them from investing significantly in their own 
shelter, in consenting to pay the relatively large connection fees for water, sanitation, 
and electricity, and from contributing labor or money to upgrading or maintaining 
minimally adequate environmental conditions and equipment within the community. 
Moser (1997) and others have shown that neighborhoods in Kingston, Jamaica, with 
the worst housing and community environmental conditions were among the most 
violent. And, because of prevailing levels of violence, efforts to upgrade these 
communities were far more difficult than in other low-income neighborhoods. Hence, 
poor housing and community environmental conditions tend to spawn not only poor 61 
health but violence, which helps to maintain high levels of poverty. It also 
compromises efforts to improve human capital in the community by giving residents a 
healthy environment. 
Insecurity of tenure also serves to make residents more vulnerable to 
exploitation by criminals, politicians, or local bosses. Money that might otherwise be 
invested in housing or land—a form of savings—is instead spent on obtaining 
promises of protection from eviction. Furthermore, with banking facilities largely 
absent in the poorest communities, savings are held in cash, either on the person or in 
the home. These resources are more easily lost or robbed than those held in safe 
storage. Worse yet, in the absence of clear and secure tenure rights, residents are at 
greater risk in the aftermath of natural disasters, fires, sectarian riots, or other activities 
that result in large-scale destruction of property. The confusion and desperation 
following such events often leads to new sets of negotiations and dependencies for 
those whose property has been destroyed. Reports from numerous cities in India where 
communal strife occurred frequently from the 1980s to the present have resulted in 
large-scale reorganization (ghettoization) of neighborhoods along religious lines. In 
most of these cases, the weakest sectors of the population have been further 
marginalized.
19 
Finally, even if self-built communities create decent homes and neighborhoods, 
other forces challenge their sustainability. Affordability, livability, and security cannot 
be maintained indefinitely if the families in these communities cannot find and sustain 
adequate sources of income. It stands to reason that when income falls to subsistence 
levels (i.e., covering the cost of a minimum food basket and essential medicines), 
                                                 
19 For a detailed description of the consequences of insecure tenure for improvements in housing and 
environmental sanitation and for personal security in Mumbai (Bombay), India, see YUVA. To 
understand how “ghettoization” along communal/religious lines occurs in that same city and others in 
India, see Khotari and Contractor. For a discussion of the links between urban renewal, ghettoization, 
communal discord, and global economic integration in Ahmedabad, India, see DaCosta.  62 
other household expenditures will be curtailed. If this persists long enough, the 
consequences of the failure to maintain the quality of shelter or to pay water and 
electricity bills can become grave. Some of the main reasons leading to income 
shortfalls in self-built neighborhoods include the following. 
The large distance between home and paid employment. Many self-built 
housing sites are located in the extreme peripheries of metropolitan areas. The dearth 
of inexpensive and relatively rapid public or private transportation networks serving 
these neighborhoods forces residents into difficult choices. The cost of commuting 
may consume a large part of the worker’s earned income and his/her nonworking 
waking hours. Commuting times of four hours per day are not uncommon for residents 
of peripheral communities in some of the largest cities in the developing world.
20 For 
women commuters, the day often begins and ends in a dangerous walk through 
darkened allies and paths between home and the nearest transport depot. The absence 
of both parents from the home for such long periods often necessitates additional costs 
for child care, or the worse option of leaving children by themselves or with others 
who may not be able to care for them adequately. Long-distance commutes also 
negatively impact the ability of community members to participate in community-
management or community-improvement activities. This may also negatively 
influence the security and environmental quality of the neighborhood, as well as the 
quality of governance that is possible in an already overworked community.
21 
                                                 
20 According to a recent World Bank (2001:310) report on Mexico, “the poor suffer the most because 
they live in peri-urban areas where the available public transport services are often badly organized and 
inadequate in terms of level of service and area served. A large percentage of the urban poor have to 
make several transfers and take hours to reach their destinations. Too often these trips cost more than 20 
percent of their income and are made in unsafe buses.” The groundbreaking study by CEBRAP (1978) 
documented the emergence of conditions such as these for São Paulo’s urban poor in the midst of the 
“Brazilian Miracle.” 
21 In their analysis of women’s changing roles in low-income urban communities for a joint UNV-
UNRISD action research project, Lind and Farmelo note that the affects of austerity over the past two 
decades in Latin America and elsewhere forced women to assume triple burdens, i.e., household 
reproduction, income generation through employment, and maintenance of the management of their 63 
A more general threat for sustaining decent housing and healthy communities 
is that of declining real household incomes. In developing countries, and especially in 
cities where the informal sector already provides the majority of employment 
opportunities, it is difficult to monitor income levels accurately. However, 
unemployment data provide some insight into household well-being. For those 
countries reporting data to the ILO in the 1990s, the trends were somber: in 11 of 17 
Asian and Pacific economies, unemployment rates increased. In the 37 Latin America 
and the Caribbean states, unemployment rates increased in 15 and decreased in 7, with 
the rest remaining relatively stable. Twelve sub-Saharan states showed unemployment 
rates in the high double digits. Only Nigeria and Zimbabwe reported unemployment 
rates of less than 7 percent after 1995 (UNHSP 2003:99). 
To this point, much of the discussion of self-building or self-help housing has 
been geared to the construction of shelter for ownership by individuals. There is, 
however, continuing interest in self-help housing developed by mutual assistance 
cooperatives, despite their relatively small contribution to relieving the housing deficit 
of the poor. Adherents to the cooperative movement cite long-standing governmental 
biases encouraging traditional forms of home ownership as the principal reason for 
eschewing mutual assistance cooperatives. Other reasons may include the more 
complex governance requirements of cooperative housing, the small amount of public 
or private resources available to them, and the dearth of institutional supports for 
cooperative housing. Within this last category would be legal and administrative 
frameworks encouraging urban governments to work with cooperatives, tax 
advantages similar to home ownership, the existence of training programs for 
prospective housing-cooperative participants, and so forth.
22 
                                                                                                                                              
local environment and community. They ask whether these roles are simultaneously sustainable without 
an active role for the state. 
22 In its review of the obstacles to establishing housing cooperatives, UNCHS (2001:209) highlighted 
the necessity of having a strong catalytic agent to mobilize low-income households into a group; the 64 
This cursory review of constraints on self-help building shows that many 
factors can inhibit the construction of adequate housing and a healthy community. 
These range, first, from issues of immediate affordability of materials and access to 
land on which to establish a first shelter; then to the implantation of public amenities 
and access to them at affordable prices to make the shelter livable and healthy year-
round; and, next, to physical security against theft, violence, and natural and man-
made disasters; and, finally, to the capacity of households and communities to 
maintain the quality of the investments they have made in their homes and 
communities over a long period of time. The final section of this report seeks to 
identify those constraints on which UNV may be uniquely suited to work, and to 
sketch out how UNV might approach these problems. 
What Can UNV Do to Promote the Realization of the Right to Adequate Housing 
through Self-Building Processes? 
It may be reasonably argued that self-built housing, either by individuals acting 
on their own behalf or collectively, will be one of the largest, if not the largest, 
voluntary activity taking place in urban areas in the developing world over the next 
several decades. The pace of rural–urban migration and the parallel process of the 
wholesale urbanization of poverty make this appear inevitable.
23 UNV, as the UN 
agency responsible for concerted thinking and action in support of volunteer action 
                                                                                                                                              
paucity of managerial, legal, or financial expertise among members; and the opportunity costs to poor 
people of involvement in collective action and management.  
23 Attention to humanitarian disasters, whether entirely man-made or natural or somewhere in between, 
will also engage massive voluntary responses, as will traditional forms of charity and more socially 
progressive forms of voluntary action by the middle classes of both developed and developing 
countries. But these are likely to pale in comparison with the numbers of hours and monetary value of 
contributions by people attempting to secure adequate housing in urban areas of the developing world. 
Never before in history have three billion poor urban dwellers simultaneously engaged in building or 
repairing homes . . . . However, “women’s work,” such as caring for children, the elderly, and the 
sick—predominantly undertaken by women and girls—taken together may rival the hours and value 
spent in the production of housing.  65 
from the local to global level, may therefore wish to adopt strategies to understand 
these processes and then to disseminate the knowledge and information that society 
needs to make the best use of these volunteer impulses and energies. Having improved 
its analysis of self-building, UNV may then seek to channel this new knowledge to 
international organizations, national governments, and civil society organizations at all 
levels. The crucial aspect of this will be less in the technical aspects of self-built/self-
help housing: physical design, the development of low-cost materials, or even the 
formulation of appropriate legal/legislative frameworks supportive of these processes. 
Many organizations are already making good progress in these areas. Rather, I would 
advise UNV to highlight and promote the “social inventions”
24 necessary to bring 
together these technical innovations into processes that are economically efficient, 
politically feasible, and socially sustainable.
25 Should these characteristics come 
together, one might even think of the volunteer effort as “transforming” societies as a 
whole. 
In most successful pilot projects of self-built housing, local- and higher-level 
authorities, NGOs, and members of marginalized communities contribute in a 
concerted fashion the social, economic, and legal resources needed to empower 
individuals and groups to collectively build healthy and sustainable homes and 
communities. The main obstacle to these processes is the lack of political will on the 
part of governments to enact and implement legislation that unlocks these resources on 
a large scale. Powerful vested interests of urban land owners, large construction 
companies, real estate developers, and financial institutions that benefit from the 
                                                 
24 A social invention is a new law, organization, or procedure that changes the ways in which people 
relate to themselves or to each other, either individually or collectively. Conger (2–3) provides a brief 
but fascinating chronology of exemplary laws, organizations, and procedures that qualify as “social 
inventions.”  
25 “Socially sustainable” in this context would be the achievement and maintenance of adequate housing 
for a growing proportion of the global population. 66 
production of “formal” housing influence political processes to prevent urban decision 
makers from acting on what they know to be valid approaches to adequately housing 
the burgeoning masses of urban poor. 
UNV’s response could be to act at the global level to promote an 
understanding of “flagship” mutual assistance/cooperative/self-building programs and 
their eventual limitations. Some of the steps that could be taken would include to 
♦  Commission a blue-ribbon panel comprising representatives (in a voluntary 
capacity) from international NGOs, UN Agencies (including IFIs), grassroots 
organizations, and domestic development NGOs, and independent urban-
governance specialists to undertake an in-depth, rolling analysis of these 
experiences.
26 This group should publish an annual report in conjunction with 
the UN’s Special Rapporteur (SR) on the Right to Adequate Housing of 
progress of specific countries (and possibly cities) in establishing an “enabling 
environment” for self-built housing. 
♦  Establish a multilingual website for the exchange of experience among 
organizations participating in self-built housing experiences. The website 
would highlight, among other things, detailed aspects of collaborations among 
local authorities, NGOs, and community organizations in their efforts to 
implement holistic urban upgrading through collective self-building processes; 
and examples of the roles and responsibilities of government agencies, NGOs, 
grassroots organizations, and international donor agencies in promoting self-
building processes. 
♦  Establish, in conjunction with SR and the Blue-Ribbon Panel, indicators for 
monitoring the progress of national and local governments in supporting self-
building processes that demonstrate high promise in improving and 
                                                 
26 UNV has already taken the commendable step of commissioning an analysis of a range of mutirao 
(mutual assistance) cooperative housing developments in Brazil.  67 
maintaining access to decent housing for low- and very-low-income urban 
residents. The indicator system would be elaborated in sufficient detail and 
simplicity of description so that grassroots groups could themselves apply the 
principles of monitoring in their own community. 
These actions will not necessarily make a great difference unless the interest 
groups who oppose pro-poor self-building processes can be co-opted to support 
change or forced to give up some of the benefits they derive from the status quo. In 
democratic societies, this can be done, only with great difficulty, through some 
combination of the ballot box, independent trade-union movements, or legal-
administrative processes that change the relative balance of power in society to favor 
the poor. It is unlikely, however, that such forces will come about without the poor 
participating fully in the political process pursuing such goals. In cities with formally 
democratic processes and over half the population living in slums, the poor are largely 
excluded from both self-development and from establishing their own political voice. 
Their organizations are too weak. Their access to education, health care, clean water, 
and sanitation are severely compromised. Their environments and social networks are 
under maximum stress. Such conditions are far more likely to lead to anomy than to 
concerted, well-directed political force. 
♦  UNV may thus wish to give special attention to promoting those self-help 
processes that empower low-income citizens to do for themselves what they 
have to do and to forge the alliances that are needed to elicit fair and effective 
actions on their behalf by governments and the market. UNV’s efforts may 
thus focus on processes that create or further the conditions of active 
citizenship through self-building processes. The author’s untested hypothesis is 
that self-building processes such as the mutirao (mutual assistance housing 68 
cooperatives) as practiced in different parts of Brazil and Uruguay are more 
likely to awaken the citizen’s consciousness than more-limited self-building 
experiences that combine in piecemeal fashion grants or loans, low-cost 
materials, and access to land without seeking to put the process of house 
construction in its larger political, economic context of community- and 
nation-building.
27 However, cooperatives such as these developed in a 
particular institutional context that may not be replicated easily outside the 
Southern Cone of Latin America. Learning how to adapt these experiences to 
local conditions, or how to promote achievement of the necessary and 
sufficient conditions to allow such models to work elsewhere, is an important 
challenge, and perhaps one that UNV should take on by sponsoring exchanges 
among housing specialists and housing movement activists in different 
countries. 
Although many countries have recently reduced their reliance on forced 
evictions to clear urban land of informal settlements, there remain, sadly, far too many 
instances of this inhuman behavior. In some fast-growing cities of Asia, forced 
evictions are becoming more frequent. The causes range from city beautification 
schemes, to mass relocations in the face of mega-infrastructure projects, to urban 
                                                 
27 Burgess has argued that self-building of homes by low-income urban residents should not be 
encouraged because it represents a form of “double-exploitation.’” The urban worker, being unable to 
earn a salary that allows him/her to rent or purchase adequate housing with the wages of employment, 
must then exploit himself in his nonworking time by providing his own means of reproduction. In the 
present environment, where decent housing for low-income populations in developing (and developed) 
countries is almost nonexistent and is believed to be growing scarcer, this argument is moot. Poor 
people will either house themselves or go without. The key question is whether they will live in healthy 
homes and settlements. As the eventual majority of society, the urban poor’s chances of success will 
depend to a large extent on their ability to exert the pressure needed to bring about social change. It is 
my impression that the long-term political socialization that occurs in some of these mutual assistance 
housing cooperatives provides one of the more promising avenues for developing the economic strength 
and political consciousness of the poor. It is from this point that collectively they may transform 
themselves and society by progressively lessening inegalitarian relationships that they have historically 
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environmental improvements aimed at attracting international sporting events and 
cultural events. Today, when informal settlements or existing legal housing is 
destroyed without adequate compensation, many residents are unable to afford new 
mass-produced, low-income housing; nor do they have the skills or knowledge to avail 
themselves of the self-building option. Nor can they easily find suitable employment 
or means of accessing the social networks that sustained them in their former location. 
For these reasons, it is best to avoid evictions and instead help residents 
improve/renovate their housing incrementally. But this cannot happen unless forced 
evictions are avoided.  Further more, it would be well to: 
♦  Establish links with the Habitat International Coalition and COHRE (Center on 
Housing Rights and Evictions) to understand how to promote best practices in 
the preventing of evictions from and the destruction of self-built housing under 
the guise of urban development, when more socially sustainable options are 
viable. 
♦  Prevent destruction of self-built housing (including deficient housing) resulting 
from sectarian violence (Ahmedabad and Mumbai, India, the Balkans, 
Palestine), as perhaps with “White Helmets” during periods of conflict. 
Finally, the absence of efficient and affordable public transport necessitates 
strategies to “grow” employment with adequate wages in close proximity to the homes 
of low-income residents, whether in center-city slums or peripheral ones. If current 
trends continue, the jobs that will be created in peri-urban settlements will be in 
informal sector microenterprises, which already employ up to half of the workforce in 
many cities in developing countries. Among the most important industries for such 
settlements will be shelter construction and improvement. Indeed, Setchell (9–13), 
drawing from his own experience in the field of disaster relief and on work by Tipple 70 
(1999) and Kellet and Tipple, estimates that the combined employment-creation effect, 
or employment multiplier, of one job created in low-cost, labor-intensive housing 
production/upgrading may be as high as six. Setchell calculates the multiplier as 
follows: “one direct livelihood opportunity in shelter provision and improvement; two 
opportunities associated with backward linkage activities; one in non-HBE (home-
based enterprise) forward linkage activities; and two in HBE activities.” 
Many of these shelter-oriented activities as well as the gamut of other 
microenterprises found in peri-urban and slum settlements locate themselves in the 
spaces adjacent to or inside the proprietor’s home. Without careful planning and 
execution of the home-working space—including its connections to essential services, 
the handling of production waste, and the ingress of inputs and egress of output—the 
mixing of economic and social reproduction under one roof can harm the health of 
family members, other workers, and neighbors. The higher the density of mixed-use 
establishments, the greater are the threats to the environment and human health. 
Holistic planning for the high-density, mixed-use low-income community is therefore 
crucial if healthy living and working conditions are to be established and maintained. 
Planning of this kind by residents has been rare in spontaneous or degraded core 
neighborhoods. Nonetheless, precedents do exist for both kinds of communities 
imposing sounder uses of both public and private space after settlement has 
occurred.
28 
♦  UNV’s contribution to promoting holistic planning for mixed-use 
microenterprise neighborhoods would be to identify, perhaps in collaboration 
with UN Habitat, a range of cases of holistic planning experiences in 
spontaneous settlements and degraded urban centers that have managed to 
                                                 
28 See, for example, cases of “integral development” in the Northern and Eastern Cones of Lima from 
the late 1980s to the present (Joseph), the cases of Mutirao 50 and Communidades in the Brazilian city 
of Fortaleza in the 1990s (Correa de Oliveira), and ongoing efforts of “Microenergia” in Argentina 
described in the brief case in Appendix 2.B. 71 
accommodate and promote microenterprises without sacrificing the health of 
local families, workers, or the environment. UNV could then work with 
specialists to codify or systematize the processes and lessons of these 
experiences and to publish them on its website in the UN languages. A longer-
range goal might then be to establish a distance-learning program for holistic 
grassroots planners, whose “teachers” would be the leaders and participants of 
some of the successful cases UNV documents. These “distance professors” 
would be, of course, UNVs. 72 
APPENDIX 2.A: 
Unchs Best Practices: Homelessness and Housing 
1.  Appropriate Grassroot Level Intervention for Cost-effective Housing—India 
2.  Batikent Project—Turkey 
3.  Build Together: The National Housing Programme—Namibia 
4.  Burgerziekenhuis Hospital, Amsterdam—The Netherlands 
5.  Community Action Planning (CAP) Methodology—Sri Lanka 
6.  Co-operative Housing in Canada: A Model for Empowered Communities—
Canada 
7.  Cost Effective Environment Friendly (CEEF) Shelter Development Strategy—
India 
8.  Frauen-Werk-Stadt—A Housing Project by and for Women in Vienna—
Austria 
9.  Graduated Plan of the City of Vienna for the Reintegration of Homeless—
Austria 
10. Homeless Families Program—USA 
11. Housing Program for Rural Areas (Foundation Costa Rica—Canada)—Costa 
Rica 
12. Housing Settlement Project in Shanghai—China 
13. Improving Living Environments for the Low-Income Households—Saudi 
Arabia 
14. Khuda-Ki-Basti—Innovation and Success in Sheltering the Poor—Pakistan 
15. Lesotho Urban Upgrading Project (LUUP)—Lesotho 
16. Low-Cost Housing—Malawi 
17. Project on Sites and Services for Low-Income Family Groups—Argentina 
18. Rough Sleepers Initiative (RSI) in Central London—United Kingdom 
19. Self Built Affordable Homes to Rent—United Kingdom 
20. Self-Contained Housing Delivery System—Thailand 
21. Self-help Housing: Mutirao 50, Fortaleza—Brazil 
22. Self-Management in Popular Shelter and Habitat Program—Venezuela 
23. Shelter Upgrading in Agadir—Morocco 
24. Single Family Housing Project in Timisoara—Romania 
25. Settlement Upgrading Project (DUA/GTZ Project)—Senegal 
Source of Best Practice Information: All of the program summaries are taken from 
the Best Practices Database compiled by UN-Habitat and with the support of the 
UNESCO-MOST Clearing House. The database is extensive and contains 700 
examples of good and best practices which were reviewed and judged by independent 
technical committees and juries for the Habitat II City Summit in Istanbul in 1996, and 73 
for the Dubai International Awards for Best Practices in Improving the Living 
Environment, in 1998. The summaries of selected good and best practices are included 
in the MOST Database because of their particular relevance to or impact on poverty 
eradication and on social cohesion. More information on the Best Practices Database, 
the Best Practices & Local Leadership Programme, and the Dubai International 
Awards can be obtained by contacting: 
Best Practices & Local Leadership Programme 
UN-Habitat 
P.O. Box 30030 
Nairobi, Kenya 
Tel: (254-2) 623029 
Fax: (254-2) 623080 
Homepage: http://www.sustainabledevelopment.org/blp/ ;  
Database: http://www.bestpractices.org/ 
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APPENDIX 2.B:The Microenergia Egalitarian Development Approach: From 
Micro-Business Neighbourhood Networks to Decent Housing
29 
Microenergia is a not-for-profit association from Argentina that believes in 
egalitarian development built on neighbourhood participation, micro-business 
networking and decent housing for low income communities. The hypothesis 
supported is that such communities naturally have the capacities to organize 
themselves to channel positive neighbourhood synergies of solidarity and enterprise, 
which are prerequisites for egalitarian development and the defense of human rights. 
Microenergia seeks out communities with these characteristics in order to provide 
guidance and support in their efforts to achieve egalitarian development. Microenergia 
encourages full participation of residents in discussing and planning concrete actions 
to solve those problems affecting the whole community, with a special focus on 
developing micro-business networks to alleviate urgent problems of poverty and 
employment. 
In these communities, micro-enterprise is the natural survival response. A 
broad spectrum of artisan products are normally developed and marketed informally 
but being the profit very small and the strategy based on individual efforts, results 
impossible to generate the needed capital to grow and make the business more 
profitable. Microenergia invites to submit individual micro-business proposals, 
providing micro-credits, training, marketing information and trade possibilities for 
neighbors integrating network. Through on job training, focus on micro-business, in 
parallel to social development projects, the egalitarian development process is 
encouraged. A moral of social inclusion arise as results of community training and 
concrete achievements of community improvement. The participation through the best 
products in regional and international fair trade create a sense of local pride and 
                                                 
29 With the kind permission of Fernando Murillo, Microenergia. 75 
belonging to the community. This is follow up by decent housing improvements, 
afforded by the growing micro-business profits, accommodating habitat and micro-
business infrastructures, normally become the trade mark of the micro-business 
neighbourhood networks. 
The egalitarian commitment is assumed in terms of cross subsidies from 
successful micro-business networks to social projects attending the more urgent 
community problems. In brief, the approach consists of five basic components: 
Training, micro-credits, community infrastructure, housing and fair trade (see Figure 
A.1). Each component contributes to building local capacities to create the 
organizational and logistical infrastructure for build a development framework upon 
practices of democratic participation. 
 
Figure A.1. The Microenergia Egalitarian Development Approach 
The approach was applied to very specific conditions of poverty and 
marginality demonstrating its strength and weakness. In the metropolitan area of 
Buenos Aires (Argentina), the complete vision was implemented in Moreno, creating a 
“hive” or community centre, seat of micro-business and community development 76 
networks. The results were very auspicious: A zero default rate, an important number 
of dwellings improved, reaching level of decent houses with micro-business shops and 
workshops, and a flourishing marketing community strategy. In the case of San Martin 
and the southern area of Buenos Aires, a protected workshop was supported 
technically and financially. Networks or “hives” were not, possibly because the high 
level of social fragmentation in the area. 
In the case of communities located in the provinces, such as the case of Brea 
Pozo (Santiago del Estero), Andresito (Misiones), Esquina (Corrientes) and Aluminé 
(Neuquén) far away from the main markets, the provision of the on-job training 
scarcely generates any development, except in terms of fair trade. The possibility to 
sell their products in Buenos Aires, directly without intermediary, was the main 
interest. But sustaining a fair trade strategy demands much more than a help to certain 
communities to help their products. It is necessary to build a platform from where 
products from vulnerable communities be promoted and sold in the big markets, with 
the support of public institutions. An initiative of this kind, known as the “First sample 
of egalitarian development” was launched in the historical “Cabildo” of Buenos Aires. 
Together with the Ministry of Interior, the “Cabildo” invites municipalities throughout 
the country to exhibit products of vulnerable communities. The response was very 
positive, attracting a huge number of applications. It is expected that such strategy will 
encourage a capacity building process for local governments committed with 
egalitarian development principles. 
The experience to the date provides valuable inputs to discuss the approach 
potential for democratising development opportunities in the age of globalisation. 77 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
SECURITY OF HOUSING TENURE IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA: BACKGROUND, TRENDS, AND ISSUES
1 
Conflicts caused by forced removals and demolitions are, as before, the main 
factor vexing social stability in Shanghai. A few private eviction companies’ 
methods are wanton and vicious. Some companies employ thugs in the dark of 
night to destroy families’ exterior stairs, doors and windows; secretly cut their 
electrical wires, break their water pipes . . . to make it impossible to live a 
normal life, forcing them to move. Even more extreme, they commit crimes 
taking lives.
2 
The historic problem of security of tenure, whether to land or housing, largely 
solved during the early years of the People’s Republic of China, has again become an 
issue of great concern. 
For anyone with a low or unsteady income in farming, manufacturing, or 
service provision, in the city or the countryside, the fear of eviction is constant. Even 
economically better-off residents may suffer eviction, but they are more likely to 
receive adequate compensation and/or to better weather the negative consequences of 
forced eviction. 
This brief case study highlights the scale of the problem of insecure tenure to 
land and/or housing in China, the variety of forces that generate this insecurity, and 
emerging policies and practices that may help reverse the current negative trends. 
The groups of people in China most affected by insecurity of tenure in China 
include the following: 
♦  Farmers, whose insecurity of livelihood in the countryside forces them to 
migrate to the cities in search of income-earning activities. Lacking an urban 
                                                 
1 Case study prepared for Enhancing Urban Safety and Security: Global Report on Human Settlements 
2007. Available from http://www.unhabitat.org/grhs/2007. 
2 Shanghai Municipal Commission, Vice Secretary, Liu Yungeng, 3 February 2005. Reported in the 
Southern Weekend, 4 March 2005.  
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residence permit, and in the absence of policies supportive of rural migrants, 
their security of tenure to shelter in the city remains tenuous, at best. Some 150 
million migrant workers live in major metropolitan centers for a large part of 
the year. 
♦  Former state-sector workers who have been laid-off or paid-off
3 by their 
employers and are living in original “welfare” housing that they bought from 
their employer during earlier housing reforms.
4 
♦  Non-state-sector workers holding urban residence permits whose incomes do 
not allow them secure tenure to housing. These may be long-term inner-city 
residents who are/were employed in either collective or informal enterprises 
and who have been renting or subletting affordable housing from private 
parties or local authorities. 
♦  Registered and nonregistered urban residents of informal/illegal settlements, 
dangerous/dilapidated housing (weijiufangwu), and residences that are illegally 
constructed or noncompliant with the housing code (weifaweiguifangwu). 
♦  All other residents of property demolished under force of eminent domain.
5 
                                                 
3 Laid-off (xiagang) state-sector workers receive a minimum maintenance allowance and reduced 
access to health care and other welfare benefits. Paid-off (maiduan) workers have agreed to free the 
employer from any liability to the worker after payment of an agreed-upon lump-sum severance 
payment (Wang, 2000, pp. 848–849). Those unable to find new employment may apply for social 
support in the form of a minimum wage (dibao) of approximately 300 RMB/month (US$1.25/day) in 
the most expensive cities. In Shanghai the disposable income of 15.5 percent of the population in 2004 
was at or below this level (SHTJNJ, 2006: DigitalShanghai graph). 
4 As many as 50 million urban residents were thought to be poor in 2000, and could thus be expected to 
have only a tenuous grip on adequate housing. Quoted from report cited by Solinger (2006). 
5 Local and national authorities have broad powers to acquire legally occupied land deigned to be 
needed for advancing the public good. This “eminent domain” power is frequently used to optimize—
from the standpoint of either engineering or public expenditure—the installation of infrastructure 
(whether for public transport, communication, sanitation, water supply, or energy generation and 
delivery, etc.), environmental remediation or protection, recreational or cultural facilities, public 
buildings and plazas, and removal of dangerous or illegal structures.  
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The paper is divided into the following sections. The first describes the 
transition from insecure pre-communist tenure systems in the countryside and the city 
to collective tenure systems in force until roughly the beginning of the 1980s. These 
assured adequate access to land and housing in the countryside and to a spartan, if 
egalitarian, allotment of housing in the cities. The second section describes briefly 
how tenure insecurity first began reappearing in cities with the advent of rural workers 
entering the cities looking for cash income in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Section 
three discusses forces that began to push rural workers off their land in ever larger 
numbers, exacerbating livelihood concerns in the countryside and increasing the 
pressure on urban centers to house those leaving the countryside for work in the cities. 
The fourth section examines the relationship between housing reform in urban areas 
and increasing insecurity of tenure for the previously securely housed workers of the 
state and collective sectors. The final section before the conclusion discusses the role 
of China’s burgeoning informal settlements that provide housing to low-income 
groups in and around many of the country’s growing cities. 
Post-1949 Security of Tenure (1949–early 1980s) 
It is not surprising that a low-income country with a huge and diverse land 
mass and population and a history of tumultuous political and economic change would 
be afflicted with problems stemming from insecure tenure. It is nonetheless surprising 
how quickly China has evolved from a country with relatively secure tenure for all 
during most of its post-1949 history to the opposite during the last decade. 
China’s largely successful transition to a highly globalized mixed economy 
from a minimally open command economy in the years since Deng Xiaoping 
announced the Four Modernizations in 1978 has much to do with this: land has 
become a scarce commodity. Prices now more accurately—if still incompletely— 
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reflect the expected return on investment to alternate uses. Land prices have risen 
dramatically during the past decade, while the development of the legal and 
administrative infrastructure governing the allocation, transfer, and conversion of rural 
and urban land has only just begun to adapt itself to existing and emerging economic 
pressures. As urban and industrial development have expanded westward in the past 
decade, problems of insecure tenure that were originally found only in the fast-
growing coastal cities and their suburbs can now be found throughout the country. 
Among the first priorities of the Communist Party after taking power in 1949 
was to reverse the age-old problem of insecurity of tenure in the countryside. Within 
three years, the government implemented an agrarian reform that redistributed rural 
land to peasants. In theory, former landlords and peasants were to receive the same 
land allocation; in many cases landlords got significantly less. The effect of the 
redistribution was to destroy the local landowning class and to replace it with the 
Communist Party. Depending on population density and the quality of land, the 
distribution ranged from 0.16 to 1.1 acre per capita. Almost as soon as land 
redistribution was complete in late 1952, the collectivization of rural land into what 
were to become people’s communes began. By the time this process reached fruition 
in 1957, the collectivization had passed through three progressively integrated stages 
of agglomeration and cooperation: mutual assistance teams, semisocialist agricultural 
producers’ cooperatives, and cooperative farms. In the final stage of agglomeration, 
People’s Communes grouped on average some 30 cooperative farms, comprising 
about 5000 households or 25,000 persons. The communes organized all economic and 
political activity within the territory occupied by its constituent farms, including the 
administration of villages, taxation, health, education, old-age care, recreation, and so  
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forth. The communes also appropriated ownership of land, housing, livestock, and 
other property. Single persons or childless couples lived in communal dormitories.
6 
In the cities, private property was gradually nationalized during the first half of 
the 1950s and redistributed for use by government offices, industrial departments, 
state and collective enterprises, and residents. Investment in new housing remained 
minimal in most cities until the 1980s and often only kept pace with the need to take 
down dangerous or otherwise unsuitable structures serving as housing. Housing 
allocations were controlled by city housing offices and work units that were able to 
build housing or dormitories for their workers.
7 
For the large majority of city residents, possession of an urban household 
registration granted access to a welfare package that included employment, housing, 
health care, education, and access to a minimum level of rationed goods. Either the 
local authority or the urban household registration-holder’s work unit (a state or 
collective employer) was responsible for arranging access to these goods. 
Despite the emergence of reforms such as the family (individual) responsibility 
system in agriculture and the institution of employment contracts of limited duration 
in the urban state sector, rural and urban collectives tended to maintain established 
responsibilities to their members for ensuring access to land or housing throughout the 
1980s. In the countryside, families or individuals contracted with the rural collective 
to lease a plot of land for a fixed price. Revenue received beyond the lease price 
remained in the hands of the lessee to apportion to fees, taxes, production costs, 
investment, and so forth. The family’s original housing entitlement remained 
unchanged. 
                                                 
6 Hsu, 1976:783–787. 
7 In its effort to protect key industries from attack, between 1965 and 1971 the government built or 
moved large-scale industrial plants to remote locations in the center and far west of China. Construction 
of these “greenfield sites” typically included dormitories for workers, many of whom vacated housing 
in the enterprise’s original location.  
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In the cities, even if health and retirement benefits were among the first 
casualties of urban reforms, housing benefits tended to remain stable into the 1990s. 
When urban labor contracts were not renewed, or were done so only with a drastic 
reduction in real income, workers’ housing entitlements were rarely affected. Top-
level decision makers perceived that adding homelessness on top of precipitously 
falling incomes among the traditional worker elite of the state sector was too great a 
threat to social stability to be considered. 
Emerging Insecurity of Tenure in Chinese Cities (late 1970s–early 1980s) 
The spread of the household responsibility system and the growing 
opportunities to market excess grain and side crops in free markets during the early 
1980s gave rural farmers incentives to work more efficiently on the land they tilled 
now that their incomes and individual efforts were intimately linked. Many farmers 
found they could bring crops in with fewer hands than under the cooperative system. 
Excess labor initially flowed into township and village enterprises, creating additional 
wealth and consumption in the countryside, and for a time helped diminish income 
inequality between the countryside and the cities.
8 
Even with these positive changes, township and village enterprises could not 
absorb all the surplus labor in the countryside. By the mid-1980s, rural migrants could 
be found circulating in large numbers in Beijing, Guangzhou, Shanghai, Shenzhen, 
and, to a lesser extent, in the other major port cities. Migrant workers sought urban 
wages not only because these were higher than those that could be earned on the farm 
but also because they were paid largely in cash rather than in kind. 
In the early phase of rural–urban migration (from the early 1980s), most 
migrants worked on construction sites, in small private restaurants, in homes as maids 
                                                 
8 Selden, 1993:182–186.  
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or nannies, or on the streets as hawkers or short-term laborers, carpenters, masons, and 
so forth. Much of the cash these migrants earned found its way back to the family in 
the countryside to build new homes or expand the ones they already occupied. 
Because rural workers did not possess urban household registration cards, they 
could not legally live in the cities. This forced many into an uneasy “clandestinity” by 
which housing provided by the temporary employer contributed implicitly a portion of 
the worker’s wage. Hawkers slept under tables in the markets where they sold 
vegetables, maids on a sofa in the employer’s home, carpenters in the rooms of the 
persons who hired them to build furniture or refit an apartment, construction workers 
on the work site, restaurant workers on the floor of the restaurants during closing 
hours, and so on.
9 Still, authorities did find workers sleeping in the open or wandering 
the streets looking for shelter, and many were incarcerated and then sent back to their 
hometowns. If they were lucky, these migrants could still return to the home on the 
piece of land in the countryside allotted to their family. 
Urbanization of Rural Land and Weakening Security of Tenure (since 1985) 
From the mid-1980s onward, large swaths of rural land in the near suburbs of 
major cities effectively entered the “urban” land market, threatening peasants’ security 
of tenure to land and housing.
10 Between 1986 and 1996, 31 cities in China expanded 
their land area by some 50 percent, absorbing a roughly equivalent amount of land 
classified as rural.
11 When this occurred, farmers were offered cash settlements or 
urban household registrations and employment as compensation for their lost farmland. 
                                                 
9 Wang, 2000, p. 855; Solinger, 1995, p. 134. 
10 Cai, 2003, p. 666. 
11 In reality, the distinction between rural and urban land near large cities was often by that time purely 
administrative. Buildings housing township and village enterprises or the high-density rural population 
already occupied land that had been farmed five years earlier. Ownership of the land remained, 
however, with the collective until the land was officially converted to “urban.”  
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Replacement housing or additional compensation was often part of the package if the 
house was lost in the transition.
12 Not infrequently, promises of employment did not 
materialize, or the employment that was offered yielded income lower than that 
obtained previously from farming. Village leaders’ frequent manipulation of land-use 
decisions for personal advantage often figured in such processes and led to numerous 
small and large conflicts with the local population.
13 
China’s landmark 1992 legislation detaching land-use rights from ownership of 
urban land, which by definition was held in “state ownership,” moved the foundation 
of the real estate market forward by allowing legal persons to transact land-use rights. 
This legislation quickly brought government agencies, enterprises, and service 
providers at all levels into the real estate market because it gave each an incentive to 
consider alternate uses for un- or underused land that they controlled.
14 During his 
“southern tour” that year, Deng Xiaoping urged southern provinces—and by extension 
the rest of the country—to learn from the example of the Pearl River Delta to be much 
bolder in their efforts to stimulate economic growth and development. 
The combination of these events created a “big enough” bang to unleash a 
sustained flood of domestic and foreign investment that kept China’s GDP growth rate 
at approximately 9 percent for the rest of the decade and to the present. These 
investments focused on infrastructure and amenities to attract and retain much larger 
flows of foreign investment and technology than were absorbed in the 1980s. Among 
them were the following: 
                                                 
12 Selden, 1993, pp. 198–201. 
13 Cai, 2003, p. 663. Cai describes the power imbalances between farmers and their leaders at the 
village and county level as the source of these manipulations. Leaders often commandeer farmland or 
other communal property and use it for their own purposes or rent the land to others without offering 
adequate compensation to the aggrieved farmers. Despite presenting hard evidence of misdeeds, 
farmers all too often found town or county officials from whom they sought redress uninterested in 
pursuing justice. Indeed, higher officials often participated in the illegal taking of agricultural land. 
14 Implementation of land-use fees in cities from 1988 began the process of getting occupiers to 
consider “how much land they actually wanted to keep control over.”  
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♦  Power-generating facilities (especially large dams), airports, train stations, 
ocean and river port facilities, subway and light rail systems, water and sewage 
treatment plants, and intra- and intercity highways; 
♦  Full-service industrial parks or economic development zones; and 
♦  Urban renewal, including new urban streetscapes, grand plazas and parks, 
world-class cultural facilities, hotels, and apartment and villa complexes for 
expatriate workers.
15 
These new facilities required large quantities of land, much of it already 
occupied, whether for farming or housing in the peri-urban areas or in the city itself. In 
almost all cases, persons living on or around the areas affected by these projects had 
no choice but to move or be moved. Impacts on farmers and their families have been 
severe because in many cases their land was seized with little if any recompense. 
Table 3.1 lists some of the chief uses for agricultural land seized under these 
conditions. 
Table 3.1. Causes for Large-Scale Rural Land Seizures and Relocations 
Hydropower projects: 
The Three Gorges Project is only the most famous among these, resulting in more than 1 million 
persons being relocated.
a Farmers’ compensation has often been much less than promised, whether in 
cash, in kind, or employment, and resulted in worsening impoverishment for many. Long after the 
resettlement officially ends, tensions remain high in the regions where relocations for such projects 
have taken place.
b New projects of a similar nature and projected negative outcomes based on past 
relocation experiences find farmers swift to react: in November 2004, an estimated 100,000 farmers 
clashed with police in Hanyuan County in Sichuan Province because of the unacceptably low 
compensation they were being offered to make way for a new dam nearby. China’s leaders had to 
impose martial law and send in paramilitary police to stabilize the situation.
c 
 
                                                 
15 See Yusuf and Wu for descriptions of investment strategies of Guangzhou, Shanghai, and Tianjin 
during the 1980s and 1990s.  
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Table 3.1 (Continued) 
Economic development zones: 
Following Deng Xiaoping’s urging during his 1992 inspection tour of China’s southern provinces, 
urban authorities in many parts of the country set out to replicate efforts of Shenzhen, Xiamen, 
Shantou, and other successful export processors to attract foreign investment. This resulted in a 
massive investment in new “economic development zones.” By 1996, within the areas requisitioned 
for construction of the zones, approximately 300,000 acres of land remained undeveloped for lack of 
investment. Roughly half was agricultural land, of which half could not be converted back to 
agricultural use. Proper compensation to the farmers was often ignored.
d Still, the number of 
economic development zones continued to grow, exceeding 6,000 by 2003. Among these, 3,763 had 
already been ordered shut down after a series of investigations begun in the same year revealed they 
had been set up on illegally seized farmland.
e More closures may result, as investigations are pending 
for many of the more than 2,000 remaining zones. 
University cities: 
These are a recent variant of economic development zones in which local authorities and university 
officials take over suburban agricultural land for the construction of new educational and research 
facilities. For city officials who preside over the installation of such facilities, demonstrating that 
they are able to do things on a grand scale while significantly pumping up local GDP is key to 
gaining promotions. For universities, the attractions include economies of scale in shared educational 
facilities and urban networks, modernized physical plants, expanded enrollment capacity, and, 
typically, an opportunity to raise revenue through real estate projects within the zones. By the end of 
2003, the 50 university cities that were already established occupied land surface equal to 89 percent 
of the land occupied by all of the other universities in the country.
f 
Villa and golf course complexes: 
Exclusive residential complexes have sprung up in the suburbs of China’s large cities. Many of the 
country’s 320 golf courses are among their chief amenities. Indeed, the world’s largest golfing 
complex, Mission Hills, is sited just outside the city of Shenzhen, adjacent to Hong Kong.
g 
According to official sources, among the first 200 courses completed only a dozen were built 
legally.
h In November 2004, the Ministry of Land and Natural Resources classified golf courses 
among “the five most egregious examples of illegal land seizures in China, noting that nearly a third 
of the land was taken improperly and that compensation had not been paid.”
i 
Transportation infrastructure: 
In 2002, 84 percent of the nation’s 147 airports were losing money for lack of business; similarly, 
super highways and ring roads outside the largest cities are quiet enough to be used for drying grain 
during the harvest season. Chinese economist Zhou Guangsheng attributes this phenomenon to 
overlapping and premature investments in transport infrastructure by cities that are too close together 
to each be served by three high-speed transport modes.
j The rapid expansion of the high-speed 
(bullet-type) rail network will make matters much worse for the airports as passengers abandon air 
travel for the cheaper and more comfortable trains. Today, despite five years of sustained high 
economic growth nationally, 33 percent of all passenger arrivals and departures occur at the airports 
of Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou.
k Meanwhile 75 percent of the nation’s other airports continue 
to lose money.
l  
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Table 3.1 (Continued) 
Notes: 
a.  Estimates of relocations from Three Gorges Project continue to vary, as does the fate of the 
migrants. However, an estimate of 1.13 million seems to be a middle figure (Jing, 1997). The 
same source (p. 90) reports the finding of China’s own Leading Group for Economic 
Development of Poor Areas that over 70 percent of the 10.2 million persons relocated in other 
reservoir projects from the 1950s to the early 1980s live in extreme poverty. 
b.  Jing, 1997; Probe International. Updates are discussed occasionally on the website of Probe 
International, http://www.threegorgesprobe.org. 
c. Bezlova,  2004. 
d.  Cai, 2003, p. 671. Local governments also found outright sales or leasing of agricultural land to 
be a good source of income. These brought in between 30 and 70 percent of local authorities’ 
income between 1987 and 1994 or, totally, about 242 billion Yuan. Peasants received about 10 
percent of this amount (Cai, p. 672). 
e. Yardley,  2004. 
f.  Zou, 2003. In one of the most egregious land-grab cases of this kind, city and provincial officials 
of Zhengzhou acquired nearly 1,000 hectares of agricultural land without payment. They also hid 
their actions from the city office of the State Bureau of Land and Resources, from whom they 
were bound by law to seek approval of their planned action. Once caught in the fraud, Zhengzhou 
city officials directed the city office (of Land and Resources) to help cover up continuing efforts 
to bring their project to fruition. Within nine months of acquiring the land, city officials 
completed construction of the facilities and moved in five universities. Apparently local officials 
could count on success: three other university cities had already been built in Zhengzhou City 
(China Daily, 2006). 
g. Jenkins,  2006. 
h. Chao,  2004. 
i. Yardley,  2004. 
j. Zhou,  2005. 
k. Kahn  2003. 
l. ZJOL,  2007. 
Urban Housing Reform, Housing Markets, and Security of Tenure 
In the early 1990s when larger coastal cities began construction of new 
housing on a large scale and installing infrastructure and amenities to attract foreign 
investors, relocations rapidly grew to a large scale. Residents who had to be moved 
were usually given replacement housing, though not always near their former 
residence. Few people objected as long as the new apartment was roughly as  
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commodious as the former and gave access to the kinds of amenities they were 
accustomed to in the previous residence. A marked reduction in commuting time from 
home to school or home to work might still trump the apartment’s physical amenities. 
On the other hand, residents did complain bitterly when a new and larger apartment 
was not near a good school or when it lacked proper shopping facilities. Worse yet 
were apartments in new, tall buildings where water pressure was low or elevators were 
slow or functioned erratically or where markets for food and other necessities had yet 
to be established nearby. 
The typical response to relocation remained, nonetheless, much as it was in the 
1980s: “the country is trying to develop, we should cooperate.”
16 In any case, urban 
residents did not feel attached to their homes as long as they felt they could eventually 
trade up by moving elsewhere when a more attractive option opened up. 
Compensation did not become an issue for city dwellers until later in the 
decade, when the deepening of housing reforms, and specifically the abolition of 
welfare housing in 1998, encouraged large numbers of renters to buy the dwellings 
they inhabited. Employees of urban state-owned enterprises, government agencies, 
and other state and better-off collective work units were among the first to take 
advantage of the policy change because they had little choice in the matter and their 
employers or the housing bureau were offering them advantageous terms.
17 With that 
transition, owners developed a keen sense of property rights. Almost as quickly, they 
                                                 
16 “Guojia qiu fazhan, women yinggai peihe.” 
17 Urban housing reform spanned from isolated experiments the late 1970s and early 1980s to near 
universalization in the major urban centers today. The process comprised many different initiatives: the 
first consisted of raising rents in small increments to cover the costs of housing provided at minimal 
cost—estimated for 1991 by Zhang (2000) at about 1 percent of the average worker’s salary (quoted in 
Duda, Zhang and Dong, 2003, p. 2)—to eventual full privatization of financing, construction, and 
ownership except for residual rental housing for very-low-income groups. For succinct descriptions of 
how this process worked for persons in the state sector prior to and after 1998, when welfare housing 
was abolished, see Plafker, 2001, and Yu, 2006.  
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began demanding compensation for anything that compromised the value or use of 
their property, especially if it was to be torn down to make way for new construction. 
At the time, government regulations concerning eminent domain and eviction 
did not (and still do not) leave room for debate: if local authorities approve a project 
requiring land occupied by individuals or other public or private interests, the local 
authority has priority. The authority involved must follow established procedures 
concerning notification, waiting period, right to fair compensation, and appeal in 
situations of disagreement on compensation or improper behavior of the parties 
involved in removal/eviction processes. Unfortunately for the dislocated party, failure 
to follow mandated eviction and removal procedures does not halt the eviction process 
to allow independent review of the case. Eviction and demolition can proceed legally 
before judgment is rendered. 
It is difficult to estimate the number of forced evictions in cities across China. 
National and city statistical annuals do not provide detailed time series on relocations 
carried out under the use of eminent domain. Piecemeal data must be collected from 
press reports, specialist publications, and internet debates of uncertain accuracy. 
Estimates of forced and violent evictions are even rarer. Case studies and research 
reports by government offices and university researchers often do provide first-hand 
data on the processes and scales of impact in specific cases. 
In large cities undergoing urban renovation, expansion, and reconfiguration, 
the numbers of relocations are almost always large. As mentioned earlier, highways 
and roads have to be installed to permit the flow of millions more motor vehicles than 
were on the road 10 years ago; subway and light rail systems need to be extended to 
move similarly large numbers of people. Preservation of historic neighborhoods 
mostly entails moving low-income populations out and installing new residential and 
tourist amenities for a smaller but more comfortably housed urban elite. Decades of  
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poor maintenance of older post-1949 buildings (15–50 years old) means they are more 
likely to be torn down than renovated. Prestige projects—museums, art galleries, 
opera houses, grand plazas, parks, parking facilities, and so forth—also absorb large 
tracts of core city land formerly occupied by housing. Urban megaprojects such as the 
2008 Olympics in Beijing and the 2010 World Expo in Shanghai generate an even 
larger number of forced evictions and relocations. At the same time, they require 
substantial government investment in hardware and marketing that are justified more 
on their potential to catalyze economic and social transformation in the city and 
country than on the intrinsic economic or social benefit of holding the event in 
China.
18 
Tenure Security for Migrant Workers 
The number of migrants workers
19 from distant and nearby rural locations 
reached somewhere between 85 and 120 million persons by the year 2000.
20 While 
this population contributed greatly to the refitting and expansion of Chinese cities in 
the 1990s and increased massively the number of persons in need of housing in or near 
the cities, the formal housing delivery system made no provision for them. But as 
Wu
21 has shown in Shanghai, where policies toward migrants have been relatively 
progressive, neither steady nor lengthy employment tenure in the city had freed 
migrants from insecurity of tenure to housing by the new millennium: 
                                                 
18 Neither the Beijing Olympics nor the Shanghai Expo (2010) are likely to break even during the 
course of the events. Nor are the long-term costs of sustaining the specially built facilities likely to be 
covered by subsequent uses. See Owen (2005) for Beijing and Asiaone (2006) for Shanghai. 
19 Migrant workforce or “floating population” (liudongrenkou). Other commonly used names for 
migrant laborers include nongmingong and wailairenkou. 
20 ADB 2004, p. 16; Yan, 2005; Wu, 2005. 
21 Wu, 2005, p. 15.  
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It is no exaggeration to say that once in the city, migrants continue to be on the 
move. With substantially higher mobility rates than local residents, they 
experience much more residential mobility. But such mobility is not 
necessarily driven by the need for tenure or even amenity. Few migrants make 
the transition from bridgeheaders to consolidators after years of living in the 
city, a trend in migrant settlement seen elsewhere in other developing countries. 
Instead most remain trapped in the private rental sector or staying in dormitory 
housing. Home ownership is yet to become attainable for migrants, and self-
help housing is largely absent because of the intolerance of municipal 
authorities. 
Today the size of the floating population may be as high as 150–200 million 
and is expected to expand further with the migration to the cities of another 300 
million rural residents by 2020.
22 With the rapid expansion of the migrant workforce, 
affordable housing options in the city center or on work sites have become scarce. The 
overflow is now taking refuge in informal settlements. More and more, these resemble 
in size and form peri-urban settlements that characterized rapid urbanization processes 
in other developing countries beginning from the 1950s. In China, the earliest of these 
developed in the 1980s on the peripheries of the faster growing major cities, that is, 
Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Shanghai, and Beijing. At first, when they grew large enough 
to draw the attention of local authorities, they were suppressed and eventually torn 
down. 
Among the largest and most famous of these cases was Zhejiangcun (Zhejiang 
Village). Before its demolition in December 1995 at the insistence of local authorities, 
Zhejiang Village housed a population of some 100,000 persons, and thousands of 
enterprises. The village largely governed itself, establishing health clinics, water and 
sanitation systems, recreational facilities, schools using the Zhejiang dialect, and so 
forth.
23 It also proved itself to be a major boon to Beijing residents who rented land to 
                                                 
22 In this scenario, China’s total urban population will reach some 830 million persons (CCIDED, 2005, 
p. 12). 
23 Jeong, 2002.  
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the village and who bought the village’s prodigious output of low-cost fashionable 
clothing. 
Beijing’s population of 16 million includes roughly 3.6 million migrants.
24 Of 
the reported million-plus people living in Beijing’s 332 informal settlements, the 2002 
census estimated that 80 percent were migrants. Today the numbers are thought to be 
much larger, but according to officials, the flows in and out of informal settlements are 
so large it is impossible to be sure.
25 More certain is that many cities around China are 
planning to suppress or redevelop informal settlements in the built-up or soon-to-be-
urbanized suburbs. In Beijing’s case, the 2008 Olympics are adding urgency to this 
task. According to the plan for Olympic construction projects, the 171 informal 
settlements within the 4th Ring Road and surrounding the Olympic stadium site will 
be liquidated. Between the end of the Olympics and 2010, another 61 informal 
settlements within Beijing’s 5th Ring Road will be completely gone as well. The fate 
of the remaining 100 informal settlements in the municipality has yet to be 
announced.
26 Where the residents of the first 232 informal settlements demolished 
prior to 2008 will go remains unclear. 
Relocations Caused or “Facilitated” by the 2008 Beijing Olympics 
The mayor of Beijing, Mr. Qisan Wang, has said that some 300,000 people 
will be relocated from sites where facilities for holding the 2008 Summer Olympics 
are to be constructed.
27 This includes competition venues, the athlete’s village, 
                                                 
24 Beijing Municipal Statistical Bureau, 2006 (referring to 2005 data, based on sample surveys). 
25 Li, et al, 2006. 
26 Li, et al, 2006. The guidelines for “zhengdun” of informal settlements are expected any time. The 
Chinese definition of “zhengdun” in the urban context can mean any of the following: “consolidate,” 
“clean up,” or “tear down.” 
27 “Dongqian,” meaning “relocation,” is the term most frequently used in the Chinese press to describe 
the process of getting residents to move from their homes. Another term, “chaiqian,” also appears 
frequently. This means to move because one’s home has been torn down. Adjectives that are applied to 
“chaiqian,” such as “qiangzhixing” and “yeman,” mean “forced” and “savage.” Formal/systematic data  
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management facilities, green spaces, transport lines, hubs, and amenities for visitors. 
However, if the standard for assessing the impact of the 2008 Olympics on relocations 
is widened to include urban development activities that were either speeded up, 
enlarged, or facilitated by the politics of “holding the best Olympics ever,” then the 
impact will be much larger.
28 
Among the projects “helped along” by the Olympics are the following: 
♦  the expansion of the capital’s transportation network—including the airport, 
subway, and light rail network, the extensive demolitions in the Qianmen 
quarter, and its planned reconstruction; 
♦  the approval and construction of a CBD on the city’s East Side; 
♦  a new round of massive public contracts and investments in the high-tech 
corridor of Zhongguancun; 
♦  the clearance of old danwei (work-unit) housing in the central east corridor 
between the 2nd and 4th ring roads to make room for high-end residential 
developments, luxury shopping complexes, and entertainment districts; and 
♦  large environmental remediation projects, including the rustication to Hebei 
Province of the main facility of the Capital Steel Factory. 
An estimate made elsewhere of the number of persons directly affected by 
demolitions/relocations in the capital for the period 2000–2008 inclusive—the high 
tide of Olympic preparations—is 1.5 million. This would include Mayor Wang’s 
estimate of those moved because of Olympic construction. By comparison, for the 
                                                                                                                                              
on these qualified forms of “chaiqian” do not exist in the public domain. As indicated in the opening 
quotation of this paper, however, public figures do admit that the scale of forced evictions amounts to a 
serious social problem. 
28 Formal planning documents issued at the national and city level have emphasized that one of China’s 
goals in holding the Olympics is to make the Beijing Games the best ever, thereby proving China is a 
first-rate country.  
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nine-year period 1991–1999, demolitions/relocations directly affected 640,000 persons, 
or roughly 70,000 persons annually. The average for the pre-Olympic period is nearly 
2.4 times larger, or 164,800 annually.
29 
Whether the some 400,000 migrant workers living in the informal settlements 
within the capital’s 4th Ring Road have been included in the mayor’s relocation 
estimate is unclear.
30 In all likelihood they have not, because very few migrant 
workers own property legally in Beijing. Moreover, because they are renters in 
illegally constructed or dangerous buildings, they have virtually no protection against 
eviction or the right to a resettlement allowance. The total direct costs of holding the 
Games have been estimated at US$37 billion. The actual cost is likely to be 
considerably higher if losses to individuals are calculated.
31 
Looking Forward 
Between 2007 and the year 2020 China’s urban population may increase by 
300 million persons over the current level of approximately 550 million.
32 Most of this 
growth will come from rural residents moving into urban settlements. As many as 200 
million persons of rural origin already spend the majority of their time working in 
cities. Many of these will not return to the countryside except to visit family members 
who have remained behind. Very few of these workers have secure tenure to their 
                                                 
29 Westendorff, 2007. 
30 The Official Workplan for the 2008 Olympic Games calls for the eradication of 171 of the existing 
332 informal settlements before the Games start. The number of migrant workers affected is a rough 
estimate based on the following calculation: of the nearly one million persons living in Beijing’s 332 
informal settlements, 80 percent, or about 800,000 persons, are estimated to be nonresidents (migrants). 
If the migrant population is distributed roughly equally among the chengzhongcun, then slightly more 
than half (171of 332) would be affected by the pre-2008 Olympics demolitions. 
31 The costs of demolishing housing, removing debris, and moving residents figure positively in the 
city’s GDP, yet no accounting is made of the residents’ losses of informal income, health, convenience, 
or social networks. 
32 FN 17 provides one source of urban population growth. Johnson (2005) quoting World Bank 
projections states that urban growth will grow to 850 million in 2015 from 520 million in 2005. In 
either case, these figures should be considered rough estimates.  
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housing in the cities. Unlike registered urban residents, migrant workers do not 
typically need to find housing for their entire families and are accustomed to moving 
in order to find work or more affordable accommodation. 
Sample survey data from 2004 confirm that living conditions of migrant 
workers are crowded and rarely provide adequate sanitation and cooking facilities.
33 
This should not be surprising given that 45 percent of migrant workers surveyed 
earned less than 500 RMB (US$60) per month. Wages such as these in China’s major 
cities make home ownership virtually impossible and rental of minimally adequate 
housing difficult.
34 Inadequate housing of migrants reflects their inability to afford 
secure tenure and the benefits deriving there from. Although systematic comparisons 
between Zhejiangcun of the early 1990s and the many informal settlements spread 
around Beijing today are impossible to make, anecdotal evidence suggests that 
migrants once could both afford and benefit from secure tenure, if only for a few years. 
There may be important lessons to learn from such comparisons where they may be 
found side-by-side today. 
For many of the approximately 50 million urban low-income residents with 
urban household registration, neither security of tenure nor living conditions may be 
much better than for migrants. Those families who own a home or still live in a 
heavily subsidized apartment may rent out part or all of their homes to migrants, 
including foreigners, to cover expenses. But these homes, especially in central 
locations, are being demolished to make way for urban development projects, many of 
which are reconfiguring on a massive scale the social, economic, and residential 
                                                 
33 Wang 2006. 
34 A sample survey of migrant workers in six major cities found only 2.5 percent purchased their own 
homes (Wang, 2006). Although many migrants have permanent homes in the countryside, one would 
expect, given the combination of weakening tenure to these and the policy to encourage large numbers 
of rural residents to transfer to urban areas, growing numbers of migrant workers to seek secure(r) 
tenure for themselves and family members who are following them to the cities in greater numbers.  
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functions of the city. The current supply of state-owned or -controlled low-rent 
housing can cover only a fraction of the demand, while the purchase prices for a 
subsidized apartment are far beyond the means of these families (see section titled 
Urban Housing Programs for “Low-Income” Residents). The pressures are 
therefore building to find simultaneously a solution to the housing needs of both 
migrant workers and registered long-term, low-income residents. 
For the lowest-income registered residents—those receiving government 
support in the form of a minimum income—open market rentals are also out of reach, 
and ownership is unthinkable. Table 3.2 uses recent data from four coastal cities, 
Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen, to demonstrate the challenge the 
lowest-income stratum in these cities face in accessing housing that may provide 
reasonably secure tenure. The cities chosen have greater resources and capacity to 
build low-income housing than any other cities in China. They also have relatively 
large and well-functioning secondary markets for both rentals and purchases of 
apartments for persons unable to access newly built accommodations. 
Table 3.2. Housing Market Challenges for the Very-Low-Income Group in Four 
Coastal Cities 
Purchase 
of 
previously-
owned 
housing 
Monthly rental for 
ordinary apartment  
(by no. of bedrooms) 
City  Hsng/m
2   1 br  2 br  3 br 
Social 
support 
per 
person 
per 
month 
Total 
social 
support 
for 
family of 
3 
Months 
of total 
social 
support 
to rent  
1 br 
Months of 
total social 
support to 
buy 1.0 m
2 
of 
economic 
housing 
Beijing 8,916  1,550 1,987 2,487 290  870  1.78  5.1 
Shanghai 12,774  1,844 2,267 3,464 290 870 2.12  7.3 
Guangzhou 5,960  1,270 1,595 2,357 300 900 1.41  3.3 
Shenzhen   9,645  1,642 2,076 2,632 300  900  1.82  5.4 
Note: All prices are in Chinese Yuan (RMB). 
Source: January 2007 Real Estate Index Monthly Report, http://www.sofun.com, Real Estate Portal, 14 March 
2007, accessed 5 April 2007.  
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In each of the four cities, the minimum income payment is either 290 or 300 
RMB (US$35 or 36) per person per month. For a family of three, the maximum 
monthly payment would be 900 RMB (US$108). A family of this size and income 
would almost certainly rent a one-bedroom apartment in what is called a “common” 
apartment block. These would typically be in buildings left over from the mass-
produced, undecorated apartments of the pre-housing-reform era or even from the late 
1990s. But they might have an independent kitchen and bathroom. Many multi-story 
buildings would not have elevators, however. In each of the four cities, one month’s 
rent exceeds the total family support from the government by a low of 140 percent to a 
high of 210 percent. 
The prospects for purchasing a one-bedroom apartment are even more dismal. 
For one square meter of a low-end apartment in the secondary market, the purchase 
price might be roughly one-half of the overall average of second-hand housing in a 
given city. In Guangzhou the ratio is most favorable: 3.3 months of a family’s total 
government stipend would purchase one square meter. In Shanghai, the same square 
meter would require all the family’s payments for 7.3 months. This analysis suggests 
that migrants and families on government assistance are likely to be competing for the 
lowest end of the informal rental market as the remaining stock of publicly operated 
housing is privatized and/or torn down. 
China’s leaders recognize the seriousness of the problem of assuring adequate 
housing for all urban residents. The government is seeking to use both market and 
nonmarket methods to rein in the explosive increases in housing costs, to build or 
purchase from the market rental housing for the lowest-income strata, and to offer 
subsidized housing to help middle-income families purchase their first homes. Low-
income (rental) housing along with subsidized commercial housing will be located 
adjacent to the major mass-transit arteries, as is being planned for Beijing and has  
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been implemented to some extent in Shanghai. While such accommodations may be at 
some distance from the central city, the new communities are being designed to offer 
convenient access to full health, educational, commercial, and recreational 
infrastructure. Expanding the coverage of the housing provident fund and instituting 
supports to help low-income families obtain mortgages, along with measures to fully 
integrate migrant-worker housing needs into formal urban-housing plans, are 
recognized as important problems but have yet to see major policy initiatives taken up 
by lawmakers. Moreover, the supply of affordable housing being offered to many 
urban markets through formal channels will fall far below the need for at least the next 
few years. 
In the meantime, the principal focus of government policy, announced on 3 
April 2007, is to rein in costs and prices of housing supplied through the Economic 
Housing program and the commercial housing market. The core of policy is to root out 
corruption in the planning, bidding, permitting, financing, land assemblage, and 
clearance, construction, marketing, and management of real estate projects. The 
assumption is that this will reduce the waste of public and private resources, diminish 
the impact of speculation, and allow a matching between the needs of consumers and 
quality of housing supplied by the market (Ministry of Construction, et al, 2007). 
Many of the concerns being targeted in the current initiative have been recognized for 
years. Responses were conceived by the responsible ministry, which then directed 
provincial and city-level offices to implement the directive. As a whole, these 
initiatives have not been implemented effectively. The newly announced policy 
intends for close cooperation among eight ministries
35 in investigating problems, 
implementing corrective measures, and continuing monitoring of performance. 
However, even under the most optimistic scenario for implementing the policy and 
                                                 
35 Construction, Development & Reform, Land, Tax, Finance, Audit, Legal Investigation, Industry & 
Commerce.  
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corrective measures, the near-term housing problems of low-income households are 
likely to grow. 
Urban Housing Programs for “Low-Income” Residents 
Shanghai’s low-rent housing (lianzufang) program is the country’s largest and 
most developed. Yet, in 2006, 0.5 percent of households meeting the program’s 
criteria participated in it (21,460 households out of a city total of 426,000). To qualify, 
households must meet the city’s requirements of being both income- and housing-
poor.
36 The much larger publicly assisted housing program, Economic Housing 
(jingjishiyongfang), receives government subsidies in the form of land contributions, 
and reduced taxes and fees to qualified purchasers. These subsidies can reduce the 
price of a similarly designed and situated commercial apartment by as much as 50 
percent. 
Still, as a number of researchers inside and outside China have calculated, 
middle- and low-middle income residents do not generally find Economic Housing 
affordable.  Households in these income categories need as much as ten years to 
accumulate the money needed for a down payment. Simulations using Beijing data 
have shown that mortgage options available in China today barely allow middle-
income families to cover their total costs of living in the subsidized (Economic) 
housing. For the next-lower income category, simulations show low-middle-income 
households running significant deficits.
37 
Aside from lack of affordability, the Economic Housing program suffers from 
other flaws, including high maximum-income requirements, lax investigation of 
purchaser credentials, and a high level of illegal sales that bring the apartments into 
                                                 
36 Yang, 2007. 
37 Duda et al, 2005, pp. 22–24.  
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the open market. Perhaps the program’s most egregious flaw is the overabundance of 
large apartments (of more than 100 square meters and some as large as 250 square 
meters) it supplied instead of small apartments (between 70 and 90 square meters) as 
intended. The larger apartments effectively price low- and middle-income families out 
of the market and subsidize high-middle-income buyers, who then frequently rent out 
the apartments on the open market. 
According to Tomba,
38 by 2002 the open market purchase price of an average 
80 square meters apartment in Beijing had already reached 33 times the average yearly 
family disposable income in the city. Even if appropriately sized Economic Housing 
were available, the lower two-thirds of the city’s income distribution could not afford 
to buy one.
39 
Concluding Remarks 
For most of China’s history since 1949, families generally held secure tenure 
to land and housing. The picture is changed considerably today. Peasants have been 
forcibly driven from their land by pollution, illegal land requisitions, large 
infrastructure projects, and insecure livelihoods, among other reasons. As workers in 
the cities, migrants find that their wages and instability of employment rarely permit 
access to long-term housing. As a result, many migrant workers live in 
accommodations that are of the lowest quality, and that are not infrequently officially 
labeled as dangerous or illegal and earmarked for demolition. 
While urban workers with stable formal-sector employment have managed to 
purchase adequate housing, those who have lost their jobs or have retired on 
inadequate pensions or disability benefits cannot afford to buy apartments. 
                                                 
38 Tomba, 2004, p. 20. 
39 Duda, et al, 2005, p. 26.  
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Commercial rental options are also out of reach. These new urban poor are trapped in 
the remnants of the state-operated housing system, in which rents are still heavily 
subsidized. These apartments, often located in core urban areas, have been allowed to 
become run down, and are prime targets for demolition. Forced evictions have 
occurred in significant numbers in these communities, very likely causing the families 
involved long-lasting distress. Migrant workers who house themselves in urban 
chengzhongcun and rundown, low-rent apartments that are also targets for demolition 
are likely to form a large part of the demand for government-sponsored low-rent 
housing. The supply of such apartments in the near term is far below the numbers 
needed. 
Government efforts to induce the private sector to produce housing that will 
meet the needs of all but the most vulnerable members of urban society have fallen 
short of expectations, causing great uncertainty for low-middle-income families. If 
recently announced policies to regulate the mainstream urban housing supply system 
do not have a strongly positive effect in the next few years, insecure housing tenure 
may well become the chief worry of the large majority of China’s urban citizenry. 
Despite the many prospective solutions being discussed at the highest level of 
government, it is unlikely that action can be taken in time to avert a housing crisis for 
the lowest income groups in many cities. Fast economic growth has produced a 
massive increase in the per capita residential housing space occupied by hukou holders 
in Chinese cities. At the same, however, the precariousness of tenure to housing for 
the lowest income decile of this group has risen sharply. Tens of millions of migrant 
workers and family members without urban hukous subsist in unhealthy and/or 
dangerous communities in both the centers and peripheries of China’s largest and 
fastest growing cities. They will continue to do so for the foreseeable future.  
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